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Panel III: Implications of the New
Telecommunications Legislation
Moderator: Dr. John M. Phelana
Panelists: David E. Bronston, Esq.b
Antoinette Cook Bush, Esq.c
J. Richard Devlin, Esq.d
Theodore C. Hirt, Esq.e
Michael Nugent, Esq.f
DANIELLE RUBANO: The third panel for today's symposium
is "Implications of the New Telecommunications Legislation." It
is my pleasure to introduce Dr. John Phelan, who will be moderat-
ing this panel. Dr. Phelan is the director of the McGannon Com-
munications Research Center here at Fordham University. We are
honored to have Dr. John Phelan with us today.
DR. PHELAN: Let me just say a brief word about the
McGannon Center to give you some idea of why I was asked to
come here today. The McGannon Center was founded ten years
ago by a seed grant from Westinghouse Electric Corp., and has
a. Director of the McGannon Communications Research Center and Professor of
Communications, Fordham University; Fordham University, A.B. 1952, M.A. 1956;
Woodstock, S.T.L. 1962; New York University; Ph.D., communications 1968.
b. General Counsel, New York City Department of Information Technology &
Telecommunications, New York, NY; Harvard College, B.A., magna cum laude 1977;
Columbia University School of Public Administration, M.P.A. 1984; Fordham University
School of Law, J.D. 1985.
c. Partner, Skappen, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Washington D.C.; Wellesey
College, B.A. 1978; Northwestern University School of Law, J.D. 1981.
d. Executive Vice President, General Counsel and External Affairs, Sprint Corpora-
tion, Kansas City, MO; New Jersey Institute of Technology, B.S. 1972; Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law, J.D. 1976.
e. Civil Division Federal Programs Bench, United States Department of Justice,
Washington D.C.; Brown University, A.B. 1972; University of Chicago Law School, J.D.
1975.
f. General Counsel for Technology & Intellectual Property, Citicorp/Citibank, New
York, NY; Georgetown University, A.B. 1975; Catholic University of America, J.D. 1978.
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subsequently received modest grants from American Telephone &
Telegraph ("AT&T") and other major players to pursue projects
connected with communications and the public interest. The
McGannon Center has run a number of policy conversations at
New York City's Lincoln Center with similar panels to this, includ-
ing people from government, industry, and the public interest sec-
tor. So, the McGannon Center has had a long interest in this area
and has published a number of studies concerning questions.'
Let me provide a macroscopic perspective on the two ways of
looking at the communications picture before our very knowledge-
able panel so expertly dissects the details. It seems that we have
had two ways of looking at the communications picture. One mod-
el may be termed the "Ritual Model" which considers communica-
tions as something that people do. Indeed, communications is
something into which people immerse themselves, but one has to
specify the context to give this definition meaning. For example,
it could be an opportunity for people to discuss important issues
and come to decisions, like a New England town meeting. Larry
Grossman, former president of Public Broadcasting Service
("PBS") and of National Broadcasting Corporation ("NBC"), re-
cently came out with a book called, The Electronic Republic,2 high-
lighting this aspect of new technologies which extend this old-fash-
ioned way of communicating with one another.
Getting information today is so much more facilitated. One of
the things that strikes me as an old guy with a Ph.D. is that when
I got a Ph.D., it was really hard getting a Ph.D., because we did
not have hard disks. Research, international bodies of knowledge,
databases, and I am sure lawyering with the electronic databases
now available to lawyers, are immensely facilitated. However, as
I point out to my undergraduate students and graduate students,
caution must be exercised, because the usual database is not like a
library. Unlike a library, a database does not contain its own meth-
1. See, e.g., Public Group Leadership Survey: Fiber Optics to the Home, Donald
McGannon Communication Research Center of Fordham University (June 1989).
2. LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: RESHAPING DEMOCRACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1995).
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ods of evaluation, so you must establish some other way of evalu-
ating that information.
Communications is also a vehicle for pornography, and reli-
gion, and to really discover who we are and what we mean. That
is the Ritual Model.
The second model is the "Transportation Model," which sees
communications as a set of devices and connections much like a
railroad for distributing goods. The goods in this case, simply put,
are messages. These messages are value-added, and the govern-
ment is particularly interested in regulating their distribution, as the
government did during the early era of railroads. This once again
raises the issues of going through different jurisdictions, through
space, with a certain amount of messages, a certain period of time
and freight goods for sale. What is the fair way to regulate this
traffic? This seems to be a very central notion in the new legisla-
tion that we Will analyze today, as the transportation model seems
to be one that is most germane and most to the front, with the
exception of the pornography and V-chip issue.
Now we begin our panel this afternoon With Antoinette
("Toni") Cook Bush, a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom in Washington, D.C. Toni Bush's comments today are par-
ticularly pertinent given her experience with the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation when the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the "1992
Act")3 was debated and pushed forward. She has a lot of inside
information and insights into the political process of what some
have called the great struggle over the recent telecommunications
between the rich and the wealthy.
MS. BUSH: Well the first thing that everybody keeps asking
is who are the winners and the losers. I am not sure if it was The
New York Times or The Washington Post that concluded that the
big winners were the Washington lawyers,4 but I happen to agree
3. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. § 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (1995) [hereinafter
the 1992 Act].
4. Cindy Skrzycki, New Deregulation Game Leaves the FCC With Tough Calls,
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with that.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act" or the
"Act")5 is also referred to as the lawyers' full employment act.6
What will become clear as we talk today is that the 1996 Act rep-
resents a tremendous leap forward for the telecommunications in-
dustry, and it is the biggest change in the Communications Act (the
"1934 Act")7 in decades. However, there is still a lot of work to be
done by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), and
state and city regulators; that will continue to cause uncertainty for
some time.
I have been asked to focus on the broadcast and Internet-related
provisions in the 1996 Act. The impetus behind the Act is very
simple. As competition increases, the need for regulatory oversight
decreases. Thus, in theory, the Act attempts to tear down, or at
least lessen, the barriers to providing service in each segment of the
telecommunications industry. You will see, as I proceed with my
presentation, that this goal will eventually be accomplished. How-
ever, there are some instances in which there will be more, not
less, regulation, at least in the near future.
In the broadcast sector, one of the areas where some of the
changes will take effect immediately, the 1996 Act substantially
relaxes the multiple ownership restrictions of the FCC.8 In particu-
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1996, at B1.
5. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter the 1996 Act or the Act].
6. Skrzycki, supra note 4, at B1.
7. Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. § 1064 (June 19, 1934) (enacted for the
purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio and creating the FCC). The Act has been amended repeatedly through the years.
Most notably, in 1992 Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. § 1460 (1995) (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) which was enacted to: (1) promote the availability to the
public of a diversity of views and information through cable television and other distribu-
tion media; (2) maximize availability to ensure continued expansion of capacity of pro-
grams offered on cable systems; protect consumer interests in receipt of cable service; and
(3) ensure cable television operators do not have undue market power. Most recently, the
Act was amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. § 56 (to be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
8. 1996 Act § 202, 110 Stat. at 110-11.
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lar, the Act eliminates the restrictions on the number of radio and
television stations that a single entity can nationally own.9 Certain
restrictions, primarily local in nature, however, have been re-
tained.10 The retention of these restrictions is largely a concession
to the Clinton administration, which on several occasions voiced
concern that the complete elimination of the ownership restrictions
would result in undue media concentration and thus impede compe-
tition and reduce diversity and localism in broadcasting. For exam-
ple, there will still be restrictions on the number of radio stations
that a single entity could own in a given market. The extent of this
limit, however, depends on the size of the market."
For television, the "duopoly rule,"' 2 which prohibits an entity
from owning more than one television station in a market, 3 re-
mains in effect.' 4 The 1996 Act, however, specifically instructs the
FCC to conduct a proceeding to determine whether the television
duopoly prohibition should be retained, modified, or eliminated. 5
If the FCC ultimately relaxes the prohibition, the Act limits the
circumstances in which a single entity could own two VHF stations
in the same market.16 Under the Act, television local management
agreements continue to be permissible, at least until the FCC deter-
mines otherwise.' 7  But, as part of the biennial review required
beginning in 1998, the FCC will have the opportunity to review all
of the ownership rules and those could be changed 8 Local man-
agement agreements in effect as of February 8, 1996, however, are
specifically grandfathered.
9. Id. § 202(a), (c), 110 Stat. at 110-11.
10. Id. § 202(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 111.
11. Id. § 202(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 110 (The Act's restrictions create applicable caps on
local radio markets containing, respectively: 45 or more commercial radio stations; be-
tween 30 and 44 (inclusive); between 15 and 29 (inclusive) and 14 or fewer.).
12. id. § 202(c), 110 Stat. at 111.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. § 202(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 111.
16. Id. § 202(e), 110 Stat. at 111.
17. See generally Michael E. Lewyn, When is Time Brokerage a Transfer of Control?
The FCC's Regulation of Local Marketing Agreements and the Need for Rulemaking, 6
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT'. L. J. 1 (1995).
18. 1996 Act § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111-12.
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The ownership revisions contained in the conference report do
not go nearly as far as the version passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives.' 9 For example, under the 1996 Act, a single entity
may not own a broadcast television station, national network, news-
paper, multiple radio stations and a cable system all in the same
market.20 But, in a major market like Los Angeles, a single entity
could own a national television network, a television station, and
operate another television station pursuant to a local management
agreement. 2' The Act also instructs the FCC to liberally grant a
one-to-a-market waiver in the top 50 markets, 22 which allows the
same entity to own up to eight radio stations, not to exceed five
radio stations in the same service (AM or FM).23
The same entity, however, could not own a cable system serv-
ing Los Angeles. Although the statutory provision prohibiting
ownership of a cable system and a television system in the same
market was eliminated by the Act,24 there still remains an FCC rule
that prohibits such common ownership.25
Finally, mergers between or among the existing networks
[American Broadcasting Corporation ("ABC"), National Broadcast-
ing Corporation ("NBC"), Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS")
and Fox Broadcasting ("Fox")] or between one of these existing
four networks and one of the new networks [Warner Brothers or
United Paramount Network ("UPN")] would also be prohibited.26
Thus, although the Act does not effect sweeping ownership deregu-
lation as initially proposed by some of its sponsors, it nevertheless
is an historic relaxation of regulation.27 Moreover, as I pointed out
earlier, this is only the beginning, because the Act instructs the
FCC to review these rules every two years and thus provides the
19. Id. § 202, 110 Stat. at 110.
20. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1995).
21. 1996 Act § 202(g), 110 Stat. at 111.
22. Id. § 202(d), I10 Stat. at 111.
23. Id. § 202(b)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at 110.
24. Id. § 202(f)(1), 110 Stat. at 110.
25. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a).
26. 1996 Act § 202(e), 110 Stat. at 111.
27. Id. § 202, 110 Stat. at 110.
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opportunity for further deregulation.28
Having outlined the extent of ownership reform, the next step
is to assess the likely ramifications on the broadcast industry. The
1996 Act, combined with the recent demise of the financial interest
and syndication rules (FINSYN), 29 and the prime time access rules
(PTAR), ° will most likely result in continued consolidation and
vertical integration in the broadcast industry. We can expect to
see more mergers, such as the Disney-Capital Cities/ABC 32 and
Westinghouse-CBS deals.33 The major broadcast television net-
works and large station group owners (both radio and television)
will likely embark on a flurry of acquisitions to increase their total
number of owned and operated stations, and will expand program
production capabilities to service their respective syndicated sta-
tions. Consequently, the market prices for broadcast properties will
probably increase substantially, and the number of independent
program producers may perhaps decrease.
With respect to television, the extent of vertical integration will
be tempered by the retention of the national audience cap. For
example, CBS, following the Westinghouse merger, has approxi-
mately a 32 percent audience penetration, and thus can only acquire
two to three more stations in mid-size markets. NBC, in contrast,
has approximately a 22 percent audience share and therefore may
28. id. § 402, 110 Stat. at 129 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 161).
29. 47 C.F.R. § 73.662 (lessening regulation on interest ownership in single televi-
sion markets).
30. Id.
31. Paul Farhi, Opening The Door To Mergers; Law Likely To Spark Phone, Cable
Deals, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1996, at HI.
32. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1996 FCC
LEXIS 682 (FCC decision approving merger); see also Paul Farhi, Walt Disney To Buy
Capital Cities/ABC; $19 Billion Merger Would Create A Giant In Movies, Television,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1995 at Al.
33. See Stockholders of CBS, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1995 FCC
LEXIS 7533 (FCC decision approving merger); see also Paul Farhi, FCC To Approve
Takeover of CBS; Agency Resolves Fight Over Children's Shows, WASH. POST, Nov. 22,
1995 at El.
34. 1996 Act § 202(c), 110 Stat. at 111 (the national audience cap restricts any of
the networks to a limit of 35 percent of the national audience).
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acquire a larger station group.
Stations having no market overlap with the network-owned-and-
operated stations would be the most likely targets. Generally
speaking, however, the new 35 percent cap 36 does not permit suffi-
cient aggregation to automatically guarantee programming or syndi-
cation success for vertically integrated companies.
With respect to radio, large group owners will probably acquire
additional stations and markets where they already have a presence,
such as Los Angeles and Chicago.
The most controversial aspects of the 1996 Act are the provi-
sions concerning the so-called advance television spectrum
("ATV"), 37 which could dramatically affect the future of over-the-
air television as we know it. At the root of the controversy is the
additional channel which each broadcaster would need in the transi-
tion to digital broadcasting so as to avoid immediately rendering
every analog television set obsolete. Senator Dole dubbed this
transitional use of the six megahertz channel a form of corporate
welfare.38
Specifically, the Act provides that the initial eligibility for ATV
licenses should be limited to existing television licensees. 39 Broad-
casters thus would not be forced to bid for this transitional channel
at auction.' The temporary use of this six megahertz of spectrum,
however, would be conditioned on the recovery of either the exist-
ing license or the new ATV license following conversion to digital
technology.4' The FCC would then be free to auction the recov-
ered channel. Consequently, broadcasters, in effect, would have
two channels for a short period, but not indefinitely.
Contrary to Senator Dole's opinion, broadcasters would not get
a free ride under the 1996 Act for three reasons. First, broadcast-
35. Id. § 202(e), 110 Stat. at 111; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(3) (explaining
how national audience penetration is calculated)).
36. 1996 Act § 202(e), 110 Stat. at 111.
37. Id. § 201, 110 Stat. at 106 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 336).
38. Mike Mills, A "Camelot Moment" on Communications, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,
1996, at HI.
39. 1996 Act § 201, 110 Stat. at 107-08 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1)).
40. id.
41. Id. § 201, 110 Stat. at 108 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 336(c)).
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ers are not being given a windfall of additional spectrum with
which to do as they please. At most, the six megahertz transition
channel should be viewed as a loan, because, due to technical con-
straints, the broadcasters cannot use their existing six megahertz
channel to broadcast both analog and digital signals.
Second, although digital technology would enable broadcasters
to provide ancillary services, such as paging and multiple streams
of programming, to the extent broadcasters provide services in
exchange for some fee or payment other than advertising revenue,
the broadcasters would be required under the Act to pay an annual
fee cumulatively equal to the amount the government would have
recovered had the spectrum been auctioned. 2 In other words, the
only services for which broadcasters would not have to pay would
be free over-the-air television which they currently provide by
analog technology.43
Finally, broadcasters' use of this transition does not preclude
the auctioning of the spectrum. At most it simply delays it, because
the FCC would be free to auction recovered channels.
Another provision of the 1996 Act which has generated stiff
opposition from the broadcast industry is that the FCC must enact
regulations requiring television sets to contain the so-called V-
chip,44 which is short for violence chip, or circuitry that would
enable viewers to block such programs.45 In order for the V-chip
to work, programs would have to be coded, which would require
a rating system. Thus, the Act requires the FCC to establish guide-
lines for rating violent and indecent programming if the industry
has not voluntarily adopted such ratings within one year of enact-
ment.46
The broadcasters' opposition to the V-chip and the attendant
rating systems stems from their fear of lost advertising revenues
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 551(c), 110 Stat. at 141 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303); see also Craig
Turner, No Victory For V-Chips In Canada; Nonviolent-TV Experiment Draws Tepid
Reactions, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1995, at F15.
45. 1996 Act § 509, 110 Stat. at 137-39 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230) ("Protec-
tion for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material").
46. Id. § 551(e)(1), 110 Stat. at 142.
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and the administrative nightmare of having to keep up with last
minute program changes.47
President Clinton and other Democratic lawmakers have jumped
on the television violence bandwagon and are urging the television
industry to stop resisting and to commence work voluntarily on a
rating system.48 The emergence of a broadcast television rating
system appears to be a certainty under Act.49
What remains to be seen, however, is whether broadcasters will
go along peacefully, which I doubt, or go kicking and screaming.
Some broadcasters have already vowed that they are going to fight
these provisions in the courts. Nevertheless, it would appear to be
in the industry's best interest to adopt a rating system voluntarily
where they would have more control over defining the system and
how it works, rather than having guidelines imposed on them by
the FCC.50
The last topic that I am going to talk about is the highly contro-
versial provisions of the 1996 Act pertaining to obscenity and inde-
cency on the Internet. 5' The provision imposes criminal liability on
those persons who knowingly create and initiate transmission of
obscene or indecent material knowing that the recipient is under 18
years of age, or who knowingly use an interactive computer service
to send or post any indecent communication to a specific person
under 18 years of age.52
The Act not only imposes liability on content providers," but
also imposes liability on online service providers that knowingly
permit telecommunications facilities under their control to be used
for such activities, and intend that their facilities be used for such
purposes.54
47. Turner, supra note 44.
48. id.
49. Jonathan Yardley, TV's Rating System: Give It An 'F', WASH. POST, Mar. 4,
1996, at D2 (broadcast industry voluntarily adopting a rating system).
50. 1996 Act § 551(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 140-41.
51. Id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 133-36 (to be codified as amending 47 U.S.C. § 223).
52. Id. § 502(2), 110 Stat. at 133-34 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)).
53. Id. § 502(1), 110 Stat. at 133 (to be codified as amending 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)).
54. Id. § 502(2), 110 Stat. at 134 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(3)).
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The Act, however, exempts from criminal liability on-line ser-
vice providers that solely provide access to the Internet." In addi-
tion, an employer would not be liable for actions taken by an em-
ployee unless the employer has knowledge of and authorizes or
recklessly disregards the employee's conduct5 6 Another defense
to liability exists for all who take reasonable, effective, and appro-
priate actions in good faith to restrict or prevent access by minors.57
These defenses are intended to assure that the focus is on bad ac-
tors-not on those who lack knowledge of a violation.
Through the so-called "Good Samaritan" protections from lia-
bility, the Act overrules prior court decisions58 which treated on-
line service providers as publishers or speakers simply because they
have restricted access to objectional material.5 9 No provider or user
of interactive computer services will be liable in civil actions for
voluntarily restricting access to material considered obscene, inde-
cent, excessively violent or otherwise objectionable.6
Given the controversial nature of the provisions regarding
Internet indecency and television violence, constitutional challenges
will likely ensue.6 1 Accordingly, the 1996 Act provides for the
expedited review of any civil action challenging such provisions.62
The Act borrows from the "must-carry" provisions 63 of the 1992
Act in order to establish a framework in which a decision by a
55. Id. § 502(2), 110 Stat. at 134 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(1)).
56. Id. § 502(2), 110 Stat. at 134 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(4)).
57. Id. § 502(2), 110 Stat. at 134 (to be codified as amending 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)).
58. Id. § 509, 110 Stat. at 138 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)); see, e.g.,
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 63 U.S.L.W. 2765, 23 Media L. Rep. 1794
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). Prodigy Services previously voluntarily censored what it deemed
unsuitable discussion in its forums, but in the case of Stratton Oakmont, did not censor
any material. Id.
59. 1996 Act § 509, 110 Stat. at 138 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)).
60. Id. § 509, 110 Stat. at 138 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)).
61. See, e.g., Playboy Entertainment Group Granted Temporary Restraining Order
From Suit To Void Discriminatory, Unfair Telecom Provision, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 8,
1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNEWSPLUS File; see also Schroeder,
Lautenberg Sponsor Bills Repealing Part of Telecom Act, WASH. TELECOM NEWS, Mar.
11, 1996, available in Westlaw, WATELNWS File.
62. 1996 Act § 561(a), 110 Stat. at 142-43.
63. 1992 Act §§ 4-5, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35.
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three-judge district court holding one of these provisions unconsti-
tutional will be directly appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court.
64
In conclusion, the 1996 Act is a remarkable piece of legislation
that takes unprecedented steps towards ending, with some excep-
tions, the regulatory burdens faced by all sectors of the telecommu-
nications industry. There does not appear to be a big industry win-
ner and corresponding loser under the legislation, except for the
lawyers. This legislation was supported by most sectors of the
communications industry.65 It has been speculated that the only
loser possibly will be some of the smaller interexchange carriers.
Even with the cloud caused by the pendency of the ATV spectrum
auctions, I expect the value of television and radio stations will
increase as those industries further consolidate.
I think that the 1996 Act is a unique piece of legislation in that
it had so much industry support,66 and very little direct consumer
interest. While there were consumer groups that participated, and
certainly state and local government entities, it was very different
from the cable legislation in that members of Congress did not
have thousands of consumers writing letters telling them what posi-
tion to take on this legislation. I think that is one of the major
reasons why such expeditious action was taken on the legislation
and the debate was somewhat more limited.
A lot of people were saying that they still thought this legisla-
tion would not be enacted until March, 1996. I tended to disagree
with them, because I felt that it was amazing that the legislation
had advanced through the various committees so quickly. That was
in large part due, again, to the widespread industry support and the
willingness of members of Congress to work on this Act from a
bipartisan perspective. So, it did not surprise me that they were
able to pull it together at the last minute and get it worked out.
64. 1996 Act § 561(b), 110 Stat. at 143.
65. See, e.g., ITAA Praises Telecom Reform Bill Passage, BUS. WIRE, Feb. 1, 1996,
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURNWS File.
66. See, e.g., Bellsouth Reaction to President Clinton's Signing of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, PR NEWSWRE, Feb. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library,
ALLNEWSPLUS File.
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I think the one political dynamic that will continue in the future
will be the interplay between Congress and the FCC as the FCC
implements this legislation. Having a Republican Congress and a
Democratically-controlled FCC could lead to continued tensions
going forward. In fact, the first issue on the agenda of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate Commerce Committee is
to examine reform of the FCC, an item about which many industry
67players are very nervous. On one hand, the industry will have the
opportunity to register every one of its complaints about FCC pro-
cesses and thus attempt to have Congress effect fairly significant
changes at the FCC. On the other hand, the industry participants
will not want to alienate the FCC, because there will be many
pending rulemaking proceedings to implement the Act. So it is
going to create an interesting dynamic over the next year. Thank
you.
DR. PHELAN: Our next speaker is J. Richard Devlin, Execu-
tive Vice President, General Counsel and External Affairs of Sprint
Corporation. Mr. Devlin was formerly with AT&T and has a lot
of first-hand experience, not only with these new technologies, but
particularly with the regulatory aspects of these new technologies.
So, I am sure he has a lot of insights into the future as well as the
past of these developments.
MR. DEVLIN: Well thank you very much. To have an intelli-
gent discussion on the impact of the 1996 Act, we really need to
come to grips with two issues: (1) What does the 1996 Act state?;
and (2) How does it differ from current rules? My job in this
introductory piece is to provide this kind of information for the
new legislation as it pertains to local and long-distance telephone
competition.
As a result of my 20 years experience in the industry, after
graduating from Fordham University School of Law, I have some
very strong ideas and views about the impact of this legislation.
While I think it is an important step, I have serious doubts that the
promised reduction in cost to consumers and the increase in com-
67. See, e.g., Senate Panel Mulls Smaller FCC; Law Would Increase Duties, DOW
IONES INDUS. NEWS, Mar. 19, 1996, available in Westlaw, COMNEWS File.
530 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
petitive alternatives will materialize in the short term.
Like Toni Bush, I believe the principal beneficiary of the legis-
lation is the legal fraternity generally, and not limited to Washing-
ton lawyers. I think this particular piece of legislation will breathe
new life into the antitrust bar, both from plaintiff and defense per-
spective.
There really is no way to address this subject without touching
on history. I think the admonition of the philosopher Santayana is
very instructive here as well. He said those that do not know his-
tory are condemned to repeat it.6 The telecommunications industry
has a wonderfully rich and vibrant history, including much litiga-
tion and regulatory turmoil.
The Department of Justice ("DOJ"), in three major efforts this
century, has taken action against the former integrated Bell System,
which included AT&T, Western Electric, and the Bell Telephone
Operating Companies ("BOCs") (collectively, the "Bell System").
The first was settled in 1913 with the commitment that AT&T and
the Bell System would stop buying up independent telephone com-
panies.69 The second was filed in 1949 and settled in 1956 with a
consent decree dealing with patents and keeping AT&T out of
certain competitive businesses.70 The focus of these two suits and
the third one to follow was anticompetitive abuses of the local
telephone bottleneck 71 which impaired other markets such as manu-
facturing and long-distance.
The third suit, which was the AT&T litigation, was filed in the
68. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON [1905-1906], VOL. I, REASON IN
COMMON SENSE.
69. The threatened antitrust suit was averted with a commitment letter from AT&T
Executive Nathan Kingsbury. The Kingsbury Commitment letter also required AT&T to
divest its interest in the Western Union Telegraph Company. See Geoffrey M. Peters, Is
the Third Time the Charm? A Comparison of the Government's Major Antitrust Settle-
ments with AT&T this Century, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 252, 254-55 (1985).
70. United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil A. No. 17-49 (D.N.J. 1956). Final
judgment, entered Jan. 24, 1956, required the Bell System companies to license patents
at reasonable royalties and essentially required Bell companies to confine their activities
to regulated telecommunication services. Id.71. "Bottleneck" refers to the Essential Facilities Doctrine in antitrust law.
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mid-1970s and settled by consent decree in 1982.72 The case actu-
ally went to trial, and the DOJ put on a very extensive case. In
ruling upon a motion for summary judgment filed by AT&T, Judge
Greene, who was administering the case, and to this day has juris-
diction over the matter, found that the DOJ had introduced very
substantial and compelling evidence that AT&T and the Bell Sys-
tem used its local telephone bottleneck to impair competition in
long-distance service and manufacturing.73
Shortly after the judge's decision, AT&T and the DOJ entered
into a consent decree that broke up the Bell System.74 First, AT&T
agreed to divest its BOCs. 75 Second, it was agreed that the BOCs
would provide equal access, meaning a consumer had the ability to
reach its long-distance company of choice without dialing extra
digits. 6 Third, the consent decree barred the divested BOCs from
entering the long-distance business (among others) until it could be
shown that there was no substantial possibility that they could use
their monopoly power to impede long-distance competition.77
The consent decree became effective on January 1, 1984, and
has been an enormous success. Competition has flourished, and
consumers now have numerous choices in long-distance service.
One example of this increased competition is Sprint. Sprint was
the first, and probably still the only, long-distance company to have
a nationwide fiber optic digital network. Sprint entered the market
and became successful with "pin drop" quality sound. The long-
distance marketplace grew from a few competitors to now close to
500. AT&T's market share dropped from the mid-80 percent mark
range to the mid-to-high 50 percent mark range. Antitrust suits
72. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
73. United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981).
74. The decree was styled as a modification of the 1956 Final Judgment and thus is
known in business and legal communities as the Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ").
See Western Elec., 552 F. Supp. at 225.
75. Id. at 226 (MFJ § I). The term "Bell Operating Company" [hereinafter "BOC"]
is defined in the 1996 Act § 3(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 58 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153).
76. Western Elec., 552 F. Supp. at 227 (MFJ § II and Appendix B).
77. The line of business restrictions are in § II.D of the MFJ. Id. The standard for
relief from line of business restrictions is in § VIII.C of the MFJ. Id. at 227-28.
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came to a total halt because none of the players in the long-dis-
tance business have a bottleneck that they can leverage to impair
competition.
The divested BOCs were not very happy with the line of busi-
ness restrictions that were imposed upon them by the Modification
of Final Judgment ("MFJ").78 Judge Greene pointed out that before
the ink was dry on the decree, the BOCs challenged and tried to
get rid of the restrictions,79 by launching frontal and collateral at-
tacks on the decree, and filing waiver requests 80 and various other
documents with the DOJ.
The BOCs have also used their considerable political influence
in an attempt to get legislative relief from the decree. In 1986, for
example, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R. Kan.) introduced
legislation to remove the decree from the DOJ and the federal
court, and move it to the FCC.8' Virtually every year since then,
legislation to override the decree has been introduced in either the
House of Representatives or the Senate.82
A lot of what is seen in the 1996 Act is a direct result of the
BOCs' attempts to get relief from the consent decree. Since there
is no Bell spokesperson here today it is incumbent on me to pres-
ent both sides of the story. I would say that the long-distance
industry considers Judge Greene a sound antitrust anchor and an
enlightened administrator of a very complex decree. In fact, Bill
McGowan, the founder of MCI Communications Corporation
("MCI"), once said that when he went to bed every night, he
prayed for the health of Judge Greene. The BOCs, on the other
hand, would say Judge Greene is a federal judge run amok and that
78. Judge Greene ruled that the BOCs must seek DOJ authorization before acquiring
conditional interests in companies engaged in lines of business foreclosed to them by the
decree. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 430, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
79. Western Elec., 552 F. Supp. at 131.
80. BOCs are required to obtain DOJ review before filing with the District Court.
81. Federal Telecommunications Policy Act: Danforth Amendment No. 3261, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S15713 (Oct. 8, 1986); see also Bob Davis, Easing of
Limits on Bell Firms' Activities Is Suggested in Report for Justice Agency, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 19, 1986.
82. See, e.g., Conference Report on S. 652, Telecommunications Act of 1996, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess., 142 CONG. REC. H1145 (Feb. 1, 1996).
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the decree basically instilled in one federal judge the telecommuni-
cations policy for this country.
Most commentators agree, and the DOJ testified this summer,
that virtually 99 percent of all long-distance calls originate or ter-
minate over the facilities of the local telephone company.83 In
other words, the local telephone company has a virtual monopoly
in their franchised area.84
The system that has been in place for a long time is to subsi-
dize local residential service for social policy purposes.8 5 The
government interest here is to have universal service-to have
affordable local service.86 Historically, this goal has been achieved
by overpricing long-distance service to subsidize local service. 7
In fact, this is still practiced today through the mechanism known
as access charges.88 Access charges are what a long-distance com-
pany pays a local telephone company to obtain access to customers
in order to originate and terminate calls. The 1996 Act keeps the
notion of these public policy subsidies alive. In fact, it actually
extends the subsidies,8 9 although it is not clear how this can occur
in a competitive environment.
The 1996 Act is extraordinary in that it requires incumbent
local telephone companies to open up their, networks for resale,
thereby making them more friendly to competitive providers,' so
83. 137 CONG. REC. S7088-01, S7091 (June 5, 1991). DOJ conceded in 1991 that
only one-tenth of one percent of long-distance traffic volume, generated by one customer
out of one million, is carried through nonregional company facilities to reach a long-
distance carrier. Id.
84. 141 CONG. REC. S8134-01, S8137 (June 12, 1995).
85. Id. at S8138.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Western Elec., Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 999 (D.D.C. 1983) (citing
United States v. AT&T, Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 224 n.376); see also AT&T Proposes
Universal Service Plan That Promotes Competition; Reduces Long-Distance Prices, PR
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 13, 1996.
88. 140 CONG. REC. E-2252-01, E2252 (Oct. 8, 1994) (statement of Hon. Earl F.
Hilliard (Ala.)).
89. 1996 Act § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 106 (to be codified at § 276(b)(1)).
90. See Research Analyst Interview-The Telecommunications Bill, WALL ST. TRAN-
SCRIPT, 1995 WL 2546699 (July 31, 1995); see also Daniel G. Bergstein, Mega Mergers
on Information Superhighway, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 1995, at 7.
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that Sprint, MCI, and AT&T can essentially buy the local tele-
phone service from NYNEX91 and resell it to the customer.92 Fur-
thermore, the Bell company or the local company must make it
available at a wholesale rate, which is defined as a retail rate less
the avoided cost of marketing, billing, collection and any other
cost.
93
As a practical matter, there will be an appearance of competi-
tion very quickly. For example, Sprint can go in and resell
NYNEX service. Thus, you can get your local and long-distance
service from Sprint; however, this will not result in any different
service. All Sprint is doing is repackaging what NYNEX offers.
There will not be intensive price competition, because we are buy-
ing from NYNEX and having to resell. So, although resale is an
important development, it is the appearance of competition, as
opposed to real consumer choice.
Section 252 of the 1996 Act discusses how the resale will oc-
cur.94 I do not mean to be disrespectful to members of Congress
who tried very hard here, but the notion of how these interconnec-
tion agreements are to be reached is one of negotiation between the
carrier seeking to enter the market and the entranced monopolist.
I would compare it to going to the Department of Motor Vehicles
and trying to negotiate more favorable terms there. It is very hard
to negotiate with somebody who has 100 percent of the market,
and has a very strong desire to keep that situation in place. Al-
though mediation and arbitration services are provided by each
State,95 this really is going to be tough sledding.
The 1996 Act does do something that I think is very helpful.
It preempts all state laws that purport to limit the ability of carriers
to provide long-distance, interstate or intrastate service,96 and I
think that is important. The Act also has a provision on universal
service97 (i.e., the aforementioned social subsidies), and describes
91. NYNEX is the acronym for New York New England Exchange.
92. 1996 Act § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 63 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A)).
93. Id. § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 68 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252 (d)(3)).
94. Id. § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 66 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252).
95. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(a)(2) and (b)(1)).
96. Id. § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 70-71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(d)).
97. Id. § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 71-75 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254).
[Vol. 6:517
1996] SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON THE 1996 TELECOM ACT 535
how the joint board9" (a combination of the federal and state regu-
lators) will get together and agree on principles" in very short
order. In addition to other things, it requires the joint Board to
consider: that quality services have to be offered at affordable
rates;1°° that all segments and regions of the United States have to
have access to advanced services;' 0' that customers in rural areas
should get the same types of services and the same price services
as available in urban areas; 02 and that discounted rates should be
available for schools and libraries for advanced services. 0 3
The problem here of course is that there really is no way to
achieve these social goals in a competitive environment without
distorting the competitive process. Even if you could attain these
goals in a competitively neutral manner, all you are essentially
doing is imposing a tax on users, forcing some users of telecommu-
nication to pay for others.
The last point that I would like to discuss is the Bell System's
entry into the long-distance market.1°4 As I mentioned, this legisla-
tion basically abrogates the AT&T consent decree. The legislation
allows the Bell companies to get into some long-distance business-
es; there are also incidental services they can do right away.105
Given the history of problems with the local bottleneck, the legisla-
tion properly sets a high standard before the BOCs can get into the
long-distance business on an in-region basis: .(1) they must have an
actual facilities-based competitor;1°6 (2) they must have implement-
ed a competitive checklist that allows competition;'O° (3) they have
to file with the FCC for a public interest determination;108 and (4)
the FCC has to refer to the Attorney General who can use any
antitrust standard he or she wants, and that decision must, be ac-
98. Id. § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1)).
99. Id.
100. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(1)).
101. Id. § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 72 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(2)).
102. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3)).
103. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6)).
104. Id. § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 86-92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271).
105. Id. § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 86 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(b)(3)).
106. Id. § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 87 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(A)).
107. Id. § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 88 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)).
108. Id. § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 89 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C)).
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corded substantial deference.'0 9
There are some quirks here. One provision says that if AT&T,
Sprint, or MCI enter the market through reselling BOC facilities,
they cannot jointly market those resold facilities with their long-
distance service. 110 This provision is hard to explain. It is also
hard to explain why Congress preempted the states from further
implementing competition in short-haul long-distance.
You may be curious as to why I have a negative attitude to-
wards this legislation at the outset. There are probably three rea-
sons. First, for this bill to make any sense at all, there is just an
extraordinary amount of State PSC and FCC work that needs to be
done. The legislation directed very short time frames for these
proceedings, and it is not feasible to assume that it can be done.
Second, the long-distance experience suggests strongly that
when you have organizations managed by people who grew up in
a monopoly environment, they will work extremely hard to fight
any loss of market share once you change to a competitive environ-
ment. So, it is safe to assume that we are going to start seeing
anticompetitive acts and lawsuits.
Finally, for this whole thing to work, the universal service
problem needs to be addressed. Thank you very much.
DR. PHELAN: Our next speaker is David Bronston, who is the
general counsel of the New York City Department of Information
Technology and Telecommunications. The Information Technology
and Telecommunications Department is an agency of about 300
people. David Bronston has a lot of responsibilities that will be
directly affected by this new legislation and he will tell us about it
right now.
MR. BRONSTON: Thank you. Let me state at the outset as
an advertisement for New York City to all these telecommunica-
tions companies, New York City is about competition. The gov-
erning principle is open competition for all players in all markets.
For example, even before this legislation, we in New York City
109. Id. § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 89 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(A)).
110. Id. § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 90 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
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had six franchises for telecommunications services"' with no regu-
lations on the pricing or services. Lately we have been working
towards making other facilities available, such as street light poles
for mobile telecommunications. 12  In fact, one of the Personal
Communications Services ("PCS") licensees for New York City, a
Sprint co-licensee, has been testing microcell radio technology1 3 as
has the cellular licensee and one of our local utilities. 1 4
In addition, for better or worse, pay telephones are now open
to competition.1 5 With the impetus of the new bill, we hope to
bring real, viable competition to cable television as well.
But even these segmentations of mobile, cable, and basic tele-
communications are problematic as the technologies converge.
Cable companies want to offer telephone and data services. Tele-
phone companies wish to offer multi-channel video programming.
Computers and the Internet offer full communications of voice,
video, and data. PCS and new generations of wireless services also
seek to be a fully competitive end-to-end network.
So we are in a transition period, moving from the old era of
scarcity, mass audiences, and monopoly providers to a new period
of abundance, personalization, and competition. As the former
president of the National Association of Telecommunications Offi-
cers and Administrators stated, "[riegulatory frameworks crafted for
historically segmented and monopolistic industries are outmoded
for a competitive environment with multiple providers offering
multiple services."' 1
6
111. See infra note 245.
112. Wireless: Metricom Signs Agreement to Deploy Ricochet as a Wireless Data
& Internet Solution in the Eleven-City Marin County Area: Metricom has now received
approval to cover 80 percent of the extended Bay Area, EDGE, 1996 WL 8071221 (Jan.
22, 1996).
113. In re Telecommunications Interconnection Arrangements, Open Network Archi-
tecture and Comparably Efficient Interconnection, 128 P.U.R 4th, 97 n.18 (Nov. 25,
1991).
114. Cox Enterprises was cited for its development of technology, specifically for
using cable TV plants to connect PCS microcells, as well as Omnipoint Communications
for its 2-GHz equipment that will facilitate the development and implementation of PCS
services and technologies. See COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, Dec. 15, 1994, at 8.
115. 1996 Act § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 106-07 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 276).
116. Telecommunications Issues at a Crossroads: Foresight and Vision Needed; Text
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Each level of government needs to define its legitimate role and
properly allocate its regulatory functions in this brave new world
under the 1996 Act. Unfortunately, the 1996 Act did not complete-
ly address these issues. In order for the new legislation to function
properly we need a clear division of regulatory functions without
any redundancies. Accordingly, the three levels of government
should each receive clearly assigned duties. If not, the result
would be preemptive laws, which the 1996 Act contains in many
instances, leading to higher costs to companies who pass on higher
rates to consumers.
It is important to discuss specific areas of the bill which ad-
dress the new regulatory paradigm, paying particular attention to
cable competition. Despite the inroads over the past few years of
some alternative cable systems such as DBS 1 7 and wireless, 8 the
most recent FCC report on cable competition found that, with a 91
percent market hold, traditional cable subscribership continues to
dwarf the combined subscribership of all multi-channel video pro-
gramming and distributors." 9 This exemplifies that there is a long
way to go in competition for cable.
One aspect of the 1996 Act, the Barton Stupak Amendment, 20
was particularly important to local governments. This proposal
of Speech by National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors President
William F. Squandron; Transcript, NATION'S CrIEs WKLY., Jan. 3, 1994, at 5.
117. Direct Broadcast Satellite or DBS Systems represent a breed of satellite technol-
ogy that combines traditional features of cable television and large, traditional satellite
dishes in a cheaper 18-inch satellite dish. Paul Farhi, For Satellite TV, A Few Marketing
Missiles; Cable Industry Attacks Fledgling Competitor's Systems as Unsafe, Unreliable
and Costly, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1994.
118. Wireless cable systems reach otherwise unattainable homes through the use of
microwaves which beam television programming. Anne Michaud, Analysts Say Wireless
Cable Has Become Ripe for Fraud, L.A. TIMES (Orange County Ed.), Apr. 13, 1994. The
advantages of this system include lower costs because of no wires, maintenance of equip-
ment and the ability to reach remote and sparse areas. Id.
119. See generally In re Implementation of Section of the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Rate Regulation and Adoption of a
Uniform Accounting System for Provision of Regulated Cable Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 2220
(Jan. 26, 1996).
120. 141 CONG. REC. H8460-01 (1995).
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concerned local control of rights-of-way.21 The provision allowed
municipalities to manage and receive compensation for the use of
the public rights-of-way, such as our city streets which are owned
and maintained at the expense of local taxpayers.122 While Sena-
tors Hutchinson, Kempthorn and Feinstein championed the proposal
in the Senate, local governments made their case at every opportu-
nity in the House, which voted 338 to 86 in support of the Barton
Stupak Amendment.123 So in a real "Perils of Pauline" situation
that didn't make it into the media, really one of the last hurdles for
this bill that could have squashed it was a last second compromise
in the conference committee that preserved our rights. The local
governments had to raise a parliamentary point of order, go to the
Congressional Budget Office and say that this would lead to un-
funded mandates and it was a real last minute issue.
Another important aspect of the 1996 Act involves telephone
company entry into the cable business. 124 Section 302 lifts the ban
on telephone companies' entry into the cable industry. 125  Tele-
phone companies which provide video services will be regulated
according to the delivery system they use: wireless, traditional
cable, common carrier or what is called open video system
("OVS"). 126  Telephone companies would fall under the new
OVS.127 If a telephone company offers two-thirds of its capacity
to unaffiliated programmers while complying with certain other
conditions, they could offer video programming as an open video
system. 128  Under this program the telephone companies would
incur some traditional cable obligations, but they may not be re-
quired to obtain a local franchise. 29 The concept of OVS is a
refinement of the video dial tone systems, which did not seem to
121. Id. at H8460.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 1996 Act § 302(a), 110 Stat at 118-24 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 651-653).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 118-19 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)).
127. Id. § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 119 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(3)(A)); see
also id. § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 121-24 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 653) ("Establishment
of Open Video Systems").
128. Id. § 302(a), 110 Stat, at 119 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(4)).
129. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 651(c)).
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attract much interest from the telephone companies. They seem to
be either pursuing-I think Ameritech in its regions have been
interested in trying to be a traditional cable franchisee or wireless
provider; NYNEX has bought into some wireless companies.
As always, the theme throughout is going to be in the details.
Not only does the legislation leave so much to the rule makings,
but the FCC is going to have to draft regulations on this in a very
tight time frame, a six month period.
Other provisions of the 1996 Act grant the FCC exclusive au-
thority to regulate direct home satellite service while prohibiting
local governments from taxing the service. 130 Local governments
may, however, tax both equipment sales (as a sales tax) and im-
provements to real property.
Another important change in the 1996 Act involves situations
where, under the 1992 Act, cable operators in large cities were
required to get franchised.13' For example, if you hooked up build-
ings without crossing the rights-of-way, you would have been re-
quired to get franchised. Now, if you went from 200 West 79th
Street to 220 West 79th Street in New York City without going
across, but you ran a wire from your antenna on 200, you served
200 and then you ran a wire to 220. As long as an operator does
not cross the rights-of-way, a franchise is no longer required. 132
This change may lead to a lot of competition in New York City,
and other large cities, where it is cost effective to hook up these
apartment buildings.
On the other hand, the franchise cable operator competing with
those types of systems is now able to offer bulk rates to these
buildings. 133 The operator may offer a bulk rate to the building at
220 West 79th Street; however, it must not engage in predatory
pricing to undercut the competitor in that building.
One final, more parochial point. The 1996 Act affirms that
local governments have the authority to determine, in a reasonable
130. Id. § 602(a), 110 Stat. at 144.
131. 1992 Act § 3, 47 U.S.C. 623.
132. 1996 Act § 301(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 114 (to be codified as amending § 522(7)).
133. Id. § 301(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified as amending 47 U.S.C. §
543(d)).
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non-discriminatory manner, the placement of mobile services and
wireless common carrier sites. 134 This brings up a zoning issue.
Except in limited circumstances, the provision prevents FCC pre-
emption of these local government decisions over zoning. Local
governments, however, may not regulate the placement of facilities
on the basis of environmental effects of radio frequency emissions
if the facilities comply with the FCC's regulation on such emis-
sions. 131
The allocation of authority discussed above takes a lot of the
headache away. Of course, this does not deal with cable competi-
tion, but in terms of what Rich Devlin was discussing with respect
to the BOCs getting into long-distance, it provided the real driving
force that gave the BOCs the impetus, the benefit, the carrot that
they needed to support the 1996 Act. NYNEX is probably going
to be among the first companies to get into this business since the
New York market has been more open to facilities-based competi-
tion than some of the other local markets of the RBOCs, or "Baby
Bells."
In terms of regulation at the state and federal level, which, as
Rich Devlin stated, is really where the action is going to be, the
FCC and states will have to ensure a number of things, including
interconnectivity, interoperative ability, elimination of market entry
barriers, rate of return regulations, and fair infrastructure sharing.
It is going to be a messy situation while it gets sorted out.
Returning to the overall implications of the 1996 Act, though
everyone wanted certainty, for the moment we are trading one
period of uncertainty for a new one. As government will have to
let the new experiments and ventures take hold andarbitrate fairly
between the competitors and the technologies, the irony of deregu-
lation and competition is that we are moving from being a regula-
tor of a monopoly to a referee of competitors at the federal, state
and local level.
That is what our position in Manhattan has been, for example,
134. Id. § 704(a), 110 Stat. at 151-52 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)).
135. Id. § 704(a), 110 Stat. at 152 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv)).
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between Time Warner Cable and Liberty.13 6 It is also happening
at state public service commissions as well. Take, for example,
Ohio and Illinois, where Ameritech and Time Warner are bat-
tling. 13
7
While it is very exciting, it is going to take a while to work this
out. I was just beginning to understand Toni Bush's work on the
1992 Act and we are still awaiting key decisions on that law. So
let us keep one eye on the prize and another on the hype. If the
deregulatory aspects of the bill lead to a 70 percent decrease in
rates by the year 2005, as I have heard predicted, then that is great.
But if it simply replaces current monopolies with new monopolies,
then I am not so sure of the benefits. Thank you.
DR. PHELAN: Thank you very much.
Our next speaker is Theodore Hirt, who is with the DOJ, as the
Associate Assistant Director of the Civil Division, Federal Pro-
grams Branch. He has also written extensively on constitutional
issues, particularly the First Amendment.
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MR. HIRT: I want to extend my thanks to the Fordham Intel-
lectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal and to all
of you for attending. I hope we can shed some light on the 1996
Act, as opposed to more darkness or shadow, because some of
these provisions are probably not crystal clear.
My first caveat, which you heard from Mr. Tyler this morning
and which I need to reiterate, is that I am not speaking as an offi-
cial spokesperson for the DOJ or the Clinton administration. The
views today are my own, and they may not necessarily coincide
with what someone from either group has said.
When I spoke at this symposium two years ago, 39 I tried to set
136. Liberty Cable Co. v. City of New York, 60 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1995).
137. Time Warner v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 661 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio 1996).
138. Theodore C. Hirt, "Symbolic Union" of Church and State and The "Endorse-
ment" of Sectarian Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment Clause Juris-
prudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823 (1989); Commentary, Why the Government is
not Required to Subsidize Abortion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1895
(1988).
139. Symposium, First Amendment and the Media: Current Issues in Telecommuni-
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up, as an analytical framework for evaluating telecommunications
reform, the principles that were set forth in Vice President Gore's
various speeches on telecommunications policy in December
1993'40 and January 1994.141 I am not going to try to analyze the
200 plus pages of the 1996 Act, but I want to focus on a few high
points.
First, let me set forth the principles which I will discuss. The
Clinton administration was strongly committed to five items:142
first, encouraging private investment in the National Information
Infrastructure, or Information Superhighway; second, promoting
and protecting competition; third, open access to that highway by
both consumers and service providers; fourth, preserving and en-
hancing the concept of universal service that Mr. Devlin has talked
about;143 and last, but not necessarily least, providing flexibility to
regulators given rapid changes in the marketplace and technology.
The Clinton administration, like everyone else, had been pre-
dicting there would eventually be one information marketplace and
a lot of players, but there were structural barriers set up by virtue
of the 1934 Act.144 The Clinton administration was and is still
looking for open competition in the marketplace, but has expressed
much concern over potential obstructions (cross subsidies and anti-
discrimination) through information bottlenecks. To reiterate what
John Tyler said about the Turner litigation, 141 in which we are
representing the government and the FCC, the "must-carry" rules
are certainly pro-active in terms of First Amendment interest, de-
spite what Mr. Joffe and his colleagues from Time Warner said this
morning.1l 6
cations Law and Cable Television, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 663
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Symposium].
140. Vice President Al Gore, Remarks before the National Press Club (Dec. 21,
1993) (transcript available from the Office of the Vice President, The White House).
141. Vice President Al Gore, Remarks before the Academy of Television Arts &
Sciences (Jan. 11, 1994).
142. 1994 Symposium, supra note 139, at 674 (remarks of Theodore C. Hirt).
143. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (addressing universal service).
144. 47 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq..
145. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994); see supra notes 70-
72.
146. See The Changing Landscape of Jurisprudence in Light of the New Communi-
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Regardless of where we go in the year 2000 or 2005, informa-
tion bottlenecks and other types of gatekeeper roles exist for the
major players in the telecommunications field, for both the local
exchange carrier and the monopoly cable operator in your local
jurisdiction. That was the reality under the 1992 Act and it certain-
ly remains the situation as of 1996. The President's signing the
1996 Act will not change immediately any of that environment.
The question remains as to what environment do we shift to. That
comes back to the point of flexibility and what has been called a
regulatory framework rather than a rigid statutory bar such as the
so-called cross-ownership rule of 533(b), 147 which is being repealed
by this legislation.1 48 This cross-ownership rule has precluded the
telephone companies from becoming cable operators.149
I would like to make a few comments about trends, perhaps the
short-term trends, and then return to the five principles. As the
previous commentators have already noted, one of the big, unan-
swered questions is whether litigation will be the hallmark of these
changes or if these problems can be worked out within an adminis-
trative framework.
My bailiwick is district court litigation. Unless a statute com-
parable to the "must-carry" statute is implicated, I rarely get in-
volved with appellate court litigation, such as petitions to review
FCC decisions. I am certain, however, that I can speak on behalf
of my colleagues at the FCC, who may or may not be looking
forward to resolving all these issues, that they definitely will not be
looking forward to a regulatory landscape that is just a repetition
of all the litigation both they and we have seen. I suppose we
would like to see an amicable solution among the competing indus-
tries and players, but I am not going to hold my breath.
One part of the 1996 Act which Rich Devlin has talked about
and which I found very intriguing is section 252,150 in which Con-
cations and Media Alliances, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 427 (1996)
[hereinafter "Panel I] (remarks of John Tyler).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b).
148. 1996 Act § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 118-24 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 651-53).
149. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b).
150. 1996 Act § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 66-70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252).
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gress says that the local telephone carriers and a requesting tele-
communication carrier should come to a voluntary agreement re-
garding the carriage on nondiscriminatory terms. 51 If that does not
work out, the case will go before both the public utility or service
commission, and the FCC, with the possibility of a private right of
action for violations. 5 2 Therefore, one can see that the potential
for litigation exists if voluntary and regulatory measures fail. Simi-
larly, section 274'5 allows the BOCs into electronic publishing,
subject to some fairly tight restrictions. 5 4 How effective this is
going to be in terms of a competitive marketplace remains to be
seen.
Focusing on the FCC, it is being put in the role of a referee in
terms of the BOCs coming into the cable marketplace. A lot of the
litigation that we were involved in, in terms of defending the so-
called cross ownership rule of section 533(b), went to the touch-
stone issue of the telephone companies criticizing the 1996 Act as
archaic, draconian, and chilling First Amendment speech.' 55  We
are substituting the clarity of the statutory prohibition with uncer-
tainty concerning the extent to which the BOCs and the other tele-
phone companies can become cable operators through these various
systems, including OVS's. Only time will tell what sort of safe-
guards are going to be put in place to assure against cross subsidies
and anti-discriminatory conduct by the telephone companies.
There is also the issue of separate affiliates, or operations. Sec-
tion 272156 says the BOCs have to maintain structural and function-
al independence. 57 This encourages subsidiary questions, including
how and whether the FCC has the resources to monitor this re-
quirement.
151. Id. § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 66 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)).
152. Id. § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 66-70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252).
153. Id. § 151, 110 Stat. at 100-05 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 274).
154. Id. § 151, 110 Stat. at 100-01 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 274(a)-(d)).
155. See, e.g., Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d
181, 198-203 (4th Cir.'1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995), vacated and remand-
ed, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
156. 1996 Act § 151, 110 Stat. at 92-95 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272).
157. Id. § 151, 110 Stat. at 92-93 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(a)-(c)).
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The final question, which goes back to a lot of the themes of
the earlier panels,, is from the perspective of the consumer's bottom
line: How much diversity of choice and viewpoints is this going
to lead to? I will not pretend or try to give you an answer, because
it is such a long-range issue. I suppose the expectation is that if
you have competitive providers of programming and these barriers
fall, or at least the level playing field barriers, which was the griev-
ance of the proponents of the legislation, including the telephone
companies who want to get into the cable business, or if you have
a level playing field, you will have the beneficial side effect of
more consumer choice in terms of programming, and thereby the
First Amendment will be advanced and not impeded by the new
regulatory framework.
Regarding the Clinton administration's goals, I would like to
highlight just a few sections for you. There are provisions that
would, at least on their face, encourage private investment. For
example, section 257158 directs the FCC to look at market entry
barriers and to determine how they may be reduced. 59 Additional-
ly, section 706' 0 talks about advanced telecommunications incen-
tives, such as wiring school systems for the Information Superhigh-
way.' 61 Section 707162 has a telecommunications development fund
which helps access capital for small businesses. 63 We have al-
ready talked about the structure as trying to open up access and, as
Rich Devlin said, we will have to see how well that works in the
real world.
Universal telephone service is another issue which will be sub-
ject to study by the joint Board. 64 There is a greater directive in
section 255165 for services to those who have disabilities.
Finally, on the flexibility side, and this will be a very interest-
158. Id. § 101, 110 Stat. at 77 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 257).
159. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 257(a), (c)).
160. Id. § 706, 110 Stat. at 153.
161. Id.
162. Id. § 707(b), 110 Stat. at 154 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 714).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 101, 110 Stat. at 71-75 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254).
165. Id. § 101, 110 Stat. at 75-76 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 255).
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ing area to play out, sections 401166 and 402167 direct the FCC, on
a very strict time table, to look at regulatory forbearance and to
streamline its regulations.1 61 I think one of the real challenges for
regulators is going to be reconciling, some of these competing de-
mands.,
The Wall Street Journal said something to the effect that the
FCC will have to come up with 80 rules under this legislation.
1 69
Although I have not talked to anyone at the FCC regarding the
accuracy of that tally, I am sure it is going to be quite a burden on
them. If simultaneously they're going to have to be looking at
sections 401170 and 402171 on how to treat regulatory forebearances
and streamline their regulations, I think they have an interesting
dilemma on their hands.
Looking at this chronologically, and more from a litigation side,
my final point is one I picked up from David Bronston. It took me
a long time to figure out the litigation and how the Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act of 1984 ("1984 Act")' worked. We have
outstanding issues with respect to the 1992 Act, including among
other things "must-carry" and "non-must-carry," and now we will
have the 1996 Act with its attendant litigation.
We are heading for a period of great uncertainty and we will
have to look very carefully for the benefits. The public interest
will have to be watched out for very carefully at all levels of gov-
ernment, to make sure that all the promises of this legislation come
to fruition. Thank you.
DR. PHELAN: Our next speaker, Michael Nugent, is the Gen-
166. Id. § 401, 110 Stat. at 128-29 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 160).
167. Id. § 402(b)(1), (3), 110 Stat. at 129 (to be codified as amending 47 U.S.C. §§
204(a), 208(b)).
168. Id.
169. Bryan Gruley & Albert R. Karr, Telecommunications: Telecom Vote Signals
Competitive Free-for-All, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1996, at B1.
170. 1996 Act § 401, 110 Stat. at 128-29 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 160).
171. Id. § 402(b)(1), (3), 110 Stat. at 129 (to be codified as amending 47 U.S.C. §
204(a), § 208(b)).
172. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521 et seq. (1988)
[hereinafter 1984 Act].
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eral Counsel for Technology and Intellectual Property at Citi-
corp/Citibank NA ("Citicorp"). Among the many responsibilities
that Mr. Nugent has are global ones that involve the use of tele-
communications for the many customers that Citicorp has.
MR. NUGENT: Thank you and good afternoon. I guess we
have to ask ourselves, what is this all about? What are we talking
about here? We have heard about telephone companies, govern-
ment, and regulators, and yet this bill is supposed to be for us,
residential subscribers, traditional users, folks who want to put
Internet pages up, businesses. So I am going to take that point of
view.
Let me tell you a little bit why Citicorp is interested. Citicorp
is a big user of telecommunications. It spends close to $ 1 billion
a year on telecommunications, and a lot of that goes to carriers,
that is including local telephone companies, those that compete
with telephone companies, long-distance companies, and interna-
tional companies. It is a big percentage of Citicorp's expense base,
and it is growing, not collapsing. It is not because communications
is getting cheaper, it is because Citicorp is using it in just about
everything. Citicorp is nothing but a bank, but it is really a soft-
ware company and a telephone company masquerading as a bank.
Additionally, Citicorp is a big provider of network-based ser-
vices. Automated Teller Machine ("ATM") networks have some
of the most sophisticated networking, particularly for redundancy
and similar factors. Funds transfer and home banking is also grow-
ing in leaps and bounds. All of these require telecommunications
interconnections. Citicorp just signed off today on mortgage pages
that are going up on the Internet. Citicorp is looking at the Internet
as a major vehicle for communications customers. In general,
telecommunications is the hub of Citibank; it is a big user, a big
provider, and also a potential competitor of telephone companies.
When AT&T offered its credit card, 173 Citicorp was very wor-
ried about AT&T's abuse of a database that it received, Citicorp
173. See In re Bank Am. Corp. v. AT&T, 8 F.C.C.R. 8782 (1993) (AT&T offered
the AT&T Universal Credit Card on March 26, 1990).
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believes, from regulated and rate pair funded subsidies. Citicorp
was concerned that AT&T would use the database to find out who
were good customers to market credit card information. 7 4 Citicorp
complained, but the FCC rejected the argument. 7 ' The issue was
resolved, but it shows that telephone companies have a lot of re-
sources at their beck-and-call to enter into competing marketplaces.
Another possibility is credit card authorization at a local switch.
There is a competitive advantage if a little telephone company can
do credit card authorization and get a penny a transaction every
time a credit card is approved, whereas Citicorp has to put it way
out in South Dakota, where it presently is, which makes it more
expensive. It then becomes more of a competitive issue.
As I said, Citicorp is a competitor, a provider, and a user. The
1996 Act is really good for big users. I cannot really talk about
small users or residential subscribers, but the 1996 Act will allow
Citicorp to pressure the telephone and cable companies to give
good rates and services. This is what Citicorp wants, but we will
see how that shakes out.
In many ways the 1996 Act allows the rest of the country to
catch up with New York, Chicago, and California. I know that is
a little chauvinistic, but many of the state public utility commis-
sions have let a lot of this stuff happen already on an intrastate
basis, and now the FCC has made sure that this happens for inter-
state services and in other areas. In that sense, the 1996 Act will
be good for Citicorp because its network is going to become more
harmonized, a little bit more sophisticated, and it is going to have
some fun with the local telephone companies and carriers.
I am going to discuss six topics. First, the promotion of the
competitive alternatives. Think of a network as having four inter-
connected locations. You have the user location or the premises,
the central office where the initial switches are located, another
central office which will take you to yet other central offices in a
local area, and then the point of presence of the long-distance carri-
174. John J. Keller & Robert Guenther, As AT&T Credit Card Charges Ahead, Banks.
Fight Back, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1990, at B1.
175. Bank America, 8 F.C.C.R. at 8782.
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er.
That is where all this competition is going to start happening.
We have seen it point-of-presence to point-of-presence with the
long-distance competition. 76  Now you are going to see all these
little links from the user premises to the point-of-presence where
you get interconnected to the long-distance market. We are going
to see a lot of competition developing because of the 1996 Act.
We have seen it to date in New York City already. 177 Both MFS
Communications Co., Inc. ("MFS")178 and Teleport Communica-
tions Group, Inc. ("Teleport") 179 are big providers who you will see
all over the country introducing competition.'80 It will be interest-
ing to see how long-distance carriers move into this arena. I can
see them starting to buy MFS and Teleport.
With the promotion of competitive alternatives in general, you
are going to see more negotiation or arbitration of connection of
local exchange carriers and allowing competing carriers to intercon-
nect those various links to the central offices, this becoming the
golden switches of the telephone company. You are also going to
see more states backing off arbitrary regulation that may be seen
as preventing others from coming in to provide services that com-
176. Points of presence ("POPs") are the locations where the telecommunications
networks of local telephone companies and numerous interexchange cariers interconnect.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
177. Liberty Cable Co. v. City of New York, 60 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
note 136 and accompanying text.
178. See John S. McCright, Telecom Industry Wired for Free-for-All Ahead, BOSTON
Bus. J., Dec. 30, 1994, sec. 1, at 4 ("Joseph Baylock, analyst with Stamford, Conn.-based
Gartner Group, sees Teleport and MFS/McCourt as the biggest winners of 1995.").
179. Teleport began providing competitive access services for New York City busi-
nesses in 1983 to compete with New York Telephone in the provision of corporate tele-
phone service in New York City. Alan Breznick, Third Fiber-optics Network Takes on
N.Y. Tel, Teleport, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Mar. 26, 1990, at 6 (discussing the entry of
Metropolitan Fiber Systems Inc. into the same market and comparing the franchising
terms established for Teleport and Metropolitan).
180. Teleport and MFS are both competitive access providers ("CAPs") which
provide direct competition to earlier access carriers by offering "local transport" services.
Such services offer an alternative connection between local telephone companies and
points of presence. See Joseph A. Post, Universal Service and the Information Superhigh-
way: Perspectives from the Telecommunications Experience, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 782,
788 (Dec 1995).
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pete with the telephone companies. More users like Citicorp will
likely put their equipment on central office and on telephone com-
pany premises so that it can interconnect to that equipment on the
telephone companies' central offices. There are many reasons to
do that, primarily involving flexibility, ease of communication, and
quickness of communication.
Citicorp is very anxious to see the BOCs emerging into long-
distance. This is going to be fun for all customers. It is going to
take some time, but NYNEX is going to start marketing right
alongside AT&T and Sprint for long-distance service. The 1996
Act will put Citicorp in a good position, because it can now say
"look what we are getting from this carrier, look what we are get-
ting from that carrier." It is going to be good for competition and
franchise by decreasing rates and improving terms, conditions, and
flexibility.
In the short term, we will begin seeing carriers and others get-
ting into the mode of being a competitive alternative, but will be
primarily in very dense locations, for example, where you have
multiple buildings on a campus or within a close geographic area.
For example, Citibank has a number of buildings that are within
eight or ten blocks of each other. The cable companies may well
be a real resource for cabling or video and related services.
That is the promotion-of-competitive-alternatives discussion.
Citicorp thinks there is going to be more competition. It is going
to be good for all of us and Citicorp is just going to have more fun
with the telephone companies.
Topic two is deregulation. More deregulation is going to come
out of this, primarily in the area of streamlining of tariffs. Right
now if we negotiate a good deal, or if we want a service, depend-
ing on what that service is, it takes a period of time before the
tariff is approved. If the net effect of a local telephone company
tariff filing is to reduce a rate, under the 1996 Act, it will be ap-
proved in seven days. That is a good thing. If it increases the
rate, it will be approved within 15 days. That is also a good thing.
Again, it is a benefit incentive for harmonizing tariff regulation
across the country and for streamlining it.
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The third topic is obscenity or indecency. Citibank is worried
because it has a lot of people on the Internet. Citibank is encour-
aging Internet use foremployees. It is an active policy to get onto
the Internet to explore, to use it, and to experiment with it. But
with this comes employees who download obscenity. It is a prob-
lem because human beings are human beings. Any company will
have problems with employees abusing the Internet. The law, from
the standpoint of a big business user, says that if you've got the
right procedures or defense mechanisms in place, if you limit ac-
cess with credit cards or Personal Identification Numbers ("PINs"),
you are not going to be held liable for this. That was a very im-
portant step for business users.
Topic four is consumer protection. I like to consider this really
another aspect of competition. I will use the AT&T database that
I mentioned before as an example. There is a thing called custom-
er proprietary network information. It is information such as who
you are, where you live, how many telephones you have, what your
numbers are, what kind of features you have, what kind of bill
payments you have, whether you subscribe to the Internet or
whether you are taking certain services off the Internet.
Citicorp is worried about the customer, worried about the tele-
phone companies using that information, particularly when the rate
payer has subsidized the creation of that data. It is a gold mine of
data which may indicate whether you are willing to subscribe to
home banking, or whether you have a telephone in your upstairs
that can be dedicated to home banking for example.
The carriers are going to have to protect the confidentiality of
this information. Carriers can use or disclose aggregate customer
information for non-service related purposes and non-phone service
purposes, but the information must also be available to other enti-
ties on a non-discriminatory basis. That is very important. In
other words, if the telephone company uses it, we must be allowed
to have access to it on the same basis.
Topic five is competitive safeguards. If the telephone compa-
nies are going to provide long-distance telecommunications services
within the franchised area, as was mentioned before, and if they are
going to engage in manufacturing, they have to do so through a
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separate affiliate for three years."' In other words, there must be
an arm's length vehicle for the marketing and the development and
the provision of that service. This argument induces more competi-
tion, even among the various parts of the telephone company as
they are trying to get business.
The separate subsidiary obligation also will apply to the use of
customer proprietary network information. A telephone company
cannot pass the information to its competitive subsidiary without
it being disclosed to others. This is something we have been fight-
ing for a long time.
The last point is wireless communication, which Citicorp con-
siders very important. Much of its future is wireless communica-
tion of ATM data. It wants people to be able to bank at their per-
sonal display, or their personal assistance, and it wants them to be
able to communicate from the telephone. Citicorp wants them to
use Citiphone banking anywhere, even on their cellular telephones.
It is putting a lot of money into encryption and security for that.
So Citicorp is very interested in wireless telecommunications.
As Dave Bronston was saying, the local zoning authority is
going to be preserved, which is good, because that is where you
really need to deal with these issues of where do you put the anten-
na, where do you put the broadcasting facilities.
There is some limitation placed on the state's authority to pre-
clude the use of facilities for new services. There cannot be dis-
crimination, so it will be interesting to see how the state and local
authorities avoid favoring one method of wireless communication
over another, particularly when many corporations like Citicorp are
pushing for as much wireless as possible.
There are also some provisions for making rights-of-way avail-
able. 82 You can just see telephone companies that have very valu-
able rights-of-way having to make them available to competitors.
That will have to apply to rights-of-way when it comes to wireless,
181. 1996 Act § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 94 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(0(1)).
182. See, e.g., 1996 Act § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(4)) (local exchange carriers' duty to afford rights-of-way access to competing
providers).
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and to government's rights-of-way with respect to putting up anten-
nae, and so on.
I guess you could say, all in all, Citicorp likes the 1996 Act.
There will be a lot of work involved in making these things real,
to make them happen, but the 1996 Act is already putting pressure
on the telephone companies.
Citicorp is already asking the long-distance carriers and
NYNEX to come in and explain how they intend to respond to the
1996 Act. Citicorp has a number of deals which it really had to
gerrymander legally in order to get around the various restrictions
in the modified final judgment,18 3 and the consent decree. Citicorp
is now asking the carriers to come discuss what we do with these
awkward service deals now that we are free.
So Citicorp is already putting pressure on the telephone compa-
nies, the carriers, and the utility companies to start thinking cre-
atively now that they have competitive opportunities. Thank you.
DR. PHELAN: I want to thank Mike Nugent for ending on a
note of incredible energy as well as clarity and giving us a whole
new meaning to the phrase "money talks." We are now going to
start off with a brief two minutes or so of reactions from each of
the panelists to what their colleagues had to say and then we'll
have questions from the floor. So, Toni Bush, we will begin with
you.
MS. BUSH: For the most part I agree with most of what my
fellow panelists have said, particularly Michael Nugent. I think he
is right that the real winners are the big customers in the big cities,
where the competition is going to arrive first. The business cus-
tomers are going to have the most choices and options. Unfortu-
nately, the corresponding side is that the largest potential losers are
residential customers due to, if nothing else, the confusion that is
likely to result over interpretation of the 1996 Act. Residential
customers are not going to be the market segment most sought
after once competition is introduced. Only through the efforts of
the FCC and the state regulators are their concerns likely to be
183. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
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addressed.
I do think that it is just a matter of time before competition
comes. We are embarking on an important new era. With all the
technological developments, we will undoubtedly have to revisit
many of these issues. The 1996 Act provides a good start, but the
FCC has a tremendous task ahead of it in implementing the 1996
Act.
MR. DEVLIN: Well, one thing I heard, and Michael Nugent
really drove it home is a basic distrust of the power of the local
telephone company-and the advantage of being the entrenched
monopolist, with the information available at your fingertips and so
forth-but it does remind me of a personal experience I had on this
legislation.
Because it was very clear that the BOCs were so effective in
lobbying this bill before Congress," the long-distance companies
decided to get together and lobby. So we formed a coalition,"8 5
and to say the meetings were awkward is a little bit of an under-
statement. There was enormous mistrust during the meetings, and,
184. Among the lobbyists enlisted by the BOCs were President Clinton's former
Deputy Chief of Staff Roy Neel, former Labor Secretary Lynn Martin, Carter administra-
tion Attorney General Griffin Bell, and former Chief Counsel of the Senate Commerce
Committee Ralph B. Everett. See Jube Shiver Jr., Reform Bill Prompts a Frenzy of
Lobbying, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at D2; ("for months, political observers said, the
Baby Bells outclassed the long-distance industry" in lobbying); Marcia Stepanek, For
Lobbying, Telecom Bill Is Manna from Heaven, DENVER POST, Aug. 20, 1995, at H-01.
185. The Competitive Long Distance Coalition represented 500 long-distance compa-
nies, including AT&T, MCI Telecommunications Corp. and Sprint Corp. Frederick H.
Lowe, Long-Distance Industry Lobbies Against Overhaul, CHI. SUN-TiMES, July 20, 1995,
at 51. Among the lobbyists enlisted by the long-distance coalition were former Senate
Majority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee, President Bush's White House Press Secre-
tary Marlin Fitzwater, and former Senator Paul Lexalt of Nevada. See Shiver, supra note
184; Stepanek, supra note 184.
For discussion of the lobbying efforts of the BOCs and the coalition, see Shiver,
supra note 184 ("[flew lobbying campaigns have been as massive and relentless as the
one over the bid to reform the nation's 61-year-old communications laws ... [f]rom the
beginning of the year, lobbyists for the coalition and the Baby Bells have ranked as the
most aggressive influence peddlers on Capitol Hill."); Stepanek, supra note 184 ("'Every-
body in this town who has a pulse has been hired by either the long-distance coalition or
the Bell operating companies,' says Rep. Michael Oxley, an Ohio Republican on the
House Commerce Committee. 'It's just amazing."').
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I will tell you honestly, this happened. Former Senator Howard
Baker, s6 now in private practice in Washington, 1 7 was the head of
the coalition. He called an emergency meeting, which I attended.
There was an MCI person to my right, and an AT&T person to my
left, and all I know is, when I got up to leave that meeting, my
fountain pen was gone. True story.
MR. BRONSTON: A few reactions. Consumers weren't at the
table in the negotiations and I think that was deliberate by the new
majority. I think the consumer groups may have had their best
chance with the Clinton administration, but I think the Clinton
administration had other issues they wanted to raise.
I did not mention cable rate aspects of the 1996 Act in my talk.
Cable rate regulation of the Cable Program Service Tier will die an
ignominious death on March 31, 1999."'8 What that is going to
mean to subscribers is probably not good in the short term. The
basic service tiers will continue to be regulated by the local fran-
chising authorities,8 9 which is not exactly a blessing.
In my earlier remarks, I also did not talk about cable entry into
the telecommunications market. City franchising authorities cannot
prohibit cable companies from entering into telecommunications
services in their cable franchises. In fact, Time Warner and
Cablevision1° are talking about getting into that business.' 9' That
186. Former Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R. Tenn.). Senator Baker was a member
of the United States Senate from 1967-1985, served as Senate Majority Leader from
1981-1985, and was the Chief of Staff for President Bush.
187. Mr. Baker is now a Senior Partner at Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell
in Washington, D.C.
188. 1996 Act § 301(b)(C), 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 543(c)(4)).
189. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (Regulation of Rates), § 544 (Regulation of Services, Facilities,
and Equipment).
190. See Elizabeth Corcoran, Time Warner to Buy Cablevision Industries; Deal
Positions Firm for Phone Competition, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1995; Skip Wollenberg, Time
Warner Buys Cablevision for $2.6 Billion, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 8, 1995 ("The
Cablevision Industries' deal ... push[es] Time Warner's subscriber total to about 11.5
million, up by about 4 million from a year ago. That will put Time Warner, the nation's
second-biggest cable TV provider, into a near-dead heat with industry leader Tele-Com-
munications Inc., which claims 11.7 million subscribers."); Bob Niedt, Time Warner
Aligns with Cablevision, SYRACUSE HERALD-J., Feb. 7, 1995 ("Cablevision Industries, a
Long Island-based cable system operator with 1.3 million subscribers, has agreed to merge
with Time Warner . . . . 'Cablevision Industries, like many cable operators, has been
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is fine. I think cable service providers in general have to get over
the customer-service perception of cable companies-and I think
they have gotten better at customer service-before they will suc-
ceed in this business and be recognized as a viable alternative tele-
phone company.
Regarding the confusion issue: I do not understand long-dis-
tance telephone offerings, and I am in the business. I think with
competition, people's eyes are going to cross, so I think that is
going to be a problem for consumers as well, going forward.
Local franchising authorities have been painted as a barrier to
entry. I do not think that has been the case. I think franchising
provides valuable services to the community: it prevents discrimi-
nation, brings in-kind services to government and local groups,1 92
imposes customer service standards,1 93 and ensures public, educa-
tional, and governmental channels. 194 Franchising has not prevent-
ed companies like MFS or Teleport from growing in revenues from
looking for partners, alliances with either a telephone company or large cable company
to enter the next level of telecommunications .... ').
191. See Corcoran, supra note 190 ("As cable companies upgrade their networks,
they hope to be able to offer voice and data services to customers much as they now offer
television, and so compete with traditional telephone companies."); Wollenberg, supra
note 190 (The deal "completes Time Warner's cable expansion plans and frees the com-
pany to focus on introducing telephone service .... "); Cable Takes on Baby Bells:
Firms Seek Slice of Phone Market, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 10, 1994 ('The
nation's largest cable television companies plan to spend more than $2 billion this fall on
equipment for providing one-stop telecommunications services to homes. Seven compa-
nies are expected to do the spending."); Jim DiLorenzo, Rochester Tel Plan Passes Key
Hurdle, TELEPHONY, May 23, 1994 ("If the Rochester plan is approved, Time Warner,
which operates Greater Rochester Cablevision, intends to offer switched business and
residential telephone and telecommunications services."); Michael Farrell, Cable TV
Provider Sets a $15M Rebuild, COPYRIGHT CAP. DISTRICr Bus. REV., Feb. 21, 1994
("Capital Cablevision Systems Inc., a cable television provider based in Albany, NY..
announced a subsidiary of its parent company, Time-Warner Inc. of New York City,
would offer local telephone service .....
192. These local franchising requirements are authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Cable
Channels for Commercial Use) and § 535 (Carriage of Noncommercial Educational
Television).
193. These local franchising requirements are authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 552 (Con-
sumer Protection and Customer Service).
194. These local franchising requirements are authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Cable
Channels for Public, Educational, or Governmental Use). '
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essentially zero to 30 or 60 million dollars in the space of four
years. 9 5 Santayana was right:'9 I picture a :photograph I have
seen of New York City in the late 19th century, with wires and
wires and wires criss-crossing the sky; as we get more competitors,
you're not going to want to look under the ground to see the spa-
ghetti that is going to be there. But that is something we have to
deal with. Where it is going to affect the subscriber most is where
the rubber meets the road-the home-wiring issues. How many
wires can we put in an apartment-building molding and who will
own and control that? It is going to be a very, very big consumer
issue going forward. Thank you.
MR. HIRT: I have three comments. First, I do not want to be
on record as understating the potential benefits of the legislation,
either short-term or long-term. I do not want my prior remarks
construed as pessimism and dismay over short-term benefits. I
think that Mike Nugent's comments, in particular, as an incumbent
user with some presumed ability to negotiate with the retailer or
wholesaler of the services, whichever it may be, show that the
existence of the legislation alone may well have impact even before
you get to the messy regulatory stage of implementing it on a long-
term or structural or broad-based basis.
My second reaction concerns the role of consumers. In the
morning panels, you heard about consumer interest; I think it is
fairly easy to articulate the consumer interest in assuring over-the-
air broadcast programming choices, which is the issue in "must-
carry." In the panel on indecency,' 97 the colloquy between Stuart
Gold and the other panelists shows that there can be a diverse audi-
ence for cable, with diverse views about what should be shown on
cable in terms of the content. 98 As Mr. Gold said, consumers
195. Records on file with the New York City Department of Information Technology
and Telecommunications.
196. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
197. See Censorship of Cable Television's Leased and Public Access Channels, 6
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register their views in that forum.199 The irony in the "macro"
stage is, how do consumers fit into a big bill like this, which is to
a large extent about competing industries? It may be counter-intu-
itive to expect consumers to rise up and comment when the issue
is not cable rates, which they see on a monthly basis if they sub-
scribe to cable. If there are competing advertisements saying "we
are just trying to have a level playing field" or "everybody should
enter everybody else's markets on an equitable basis" -who can
be against that in the abstract? How are you going to get people
to comment in a situation like that?
There is another issue, which is not a legal one, which has had
consumers voice their views in the context of national economic
legislation. If Mike Nugent will forgive the analogy, one of the
other unresolved issues in the Congress, is, how do you deal with
the regulation of financial institutions? What are the respective
roles of banks, insurance companies, the securities industry and
related interests, and the various statutes that regulate them? For
example, the Glass-Steagall Act sets out statutory prohibitions such
as what banks can do vis-at-vis the securities industry.2°  Once
again the same issue arises-where does the consumer fit in?
A final point is that-without implying that there is any diver-
gence between the Clinton administration and the 1996
Act-section 257,201 the market entry barriers provision, has a
statement of national policy in it which struck me as significant.
The provision states that, in implementing the market entry barriers
provision, "the Commission shall seek to promote the policies and
purposes of this Act favoring diversity of media voices, vigorous
economic competition, technological advancement and promotion
of the public interest, convenience and necessity. '20 2 So you have
Congress saying that the FCC should try to accomplish all of these
199. Id.
200. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (prohibiting banks from involvement with the securities indus-
try), § 378 (prohibiting the securities industry from engaging in banking); see, e.g., Invest-
ment Co. Institute v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540, 1542 (D.C: Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847
(1987).
201. 1996 Act § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 77 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 257).
202. 1996 Act § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 77 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 257(b)).
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objectives.
MR. NUGENT: One of the concerns I had when listening,
especially to Rich Devlin and Toni Bush, about the impact of sub-
sequent proceedings on the 1996 Act, was how long it might take
for some of this to happen. I had not really appreciated how long
it might take. I wonder if they have any idea whether-and this is
a tough question-it is going to be one year or a couple of years
before we see implementation of key parts of the 1996 Act?
MS. BUSH: Well I will take a crack at it and then Rich Devlin
can give his view. The FCC is looking at this issue, and it is hop-
ing to initiate rulemaking proceedings as soon as possible. The
FCC is also in the process of evaluating which provisions of the
1996 Act require implementing regulations and which provisions
are self-effectuating. As I pointed out earlier, many provisions,
like the broadcast multiple ownership restrictions, change automati-
cally without the need for FCC action. But in other areas the FCC
is statutorily required to promulgate implementing regulations with-
in a prescribed time period. For example, the FCC must promul-
gate, within six months, regulations implementing the interconnec-
tion obligations imposed on local exchange carriers. The universal
service regulations must be adopted within 15 months. Even given
those timetables, the question will be whether the regulations go
into effect if there are pending appeals, petitions for reconsidera-
tion, or court challenges. I estimate that it will be a couple of
years before implementation is anywhere near completion.
We saw this delay of implementation of FCC regulations pend-
ing the resolution of court challenges on a mini-scale in the area of
personal communications service ("PCS"), where the FCC was very
quick in adopting rules.0 3 Although some appeals are still pending
in the courts and some issues are left unresolved, the FCC did
move very quickly and had the bulk done within a year.
Obviously the 1996 Act involves FCC implementation on a
much larger scale. The bulk of the responsibility will fall on the
Common Carrier Bureau2°4 and the Wireless Bureau2 5 of the FCC.
203. See supra pp. 536-42 (comments of David Bronston).
204. The Common Carrier Bureau regulates interstate wireline "common carrier"
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Two or three years will likely pass before all the dust is settled,
but there will be things that can happen in the interim. The inci-
dental services provisions are pretty much self-executing, so the
BOCs will be able to provide incidental interexchange services
such as long-distance, mobile long-distance, video, and data retriev-
al immediately.
MR. DEVLIN: I agree with everything Ms. Bush said, but I
want to point out that, in a lot of respects, the speed with which
local competition will occur is in the hands of the local telephone
companies. The BOCs have an incentive to act quickly because
local competition is a prerequisite for them to get into long-dis-
tance business. Whether, in fact, they view it in their business
interest to move quickly to give up their monopoly in order to get
into a business where there are already 500 competitors, I cannot
answer.
DR. PHELAN: Now we'll open it up to the floor for questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ms. Bush, regarding the provisions
concerning the Internet2' and, specifically, the obscenity and inde-
cency provisions,2° was any thought given in the legislature to the
fact that the World Wide Web, in particular is, by definition, a
worldwide system and that a lot of the sites and providers are not
actually located in the United States? How, if at all, does the 1996
services such as telephone and telegraph companies. See FCC: Common Carrier Bureau
(Apr. 2, 1996) (available at http://www.fcc.gov/ccb.html) (on file with the Fordham Intel-
lectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
205. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau ("The Wireless Bureau") handles all
FCC domestic wireless telecommunications programs and policies, except those involving
satellite communications or broadcasting, including licensing, enforcement, and regulatory
functions. See FCC: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Apr. 2, 1996) (available at
http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/wtborg.html) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media & Entertainment Law Journal). Wireless communications services include cellular
telephone, paging, personal communications services, public safety, and other commercial
and private radio services. The Bureau also is responsible for implementing the competi-
tive bidding authority for spectrum auctions, given to the Commission by the 1993 Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act. Id.
206. 1996 Act § 509, 110 Stat. at 139 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 230(e)(1)) (defin-
ing the term "Internet" as "the international computer network of both Federal and non-
Federal interoperable packet switched data networks").
207. See 1996 Act §§ 501-61, 110 Stat. at 133-43.
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Act deal with the possibility of indecent or obscene materials being
transmitted into the United States from outside the United States?
MS. BUSH: Well, certainly the issue was raised. Whether
Congress adequately considered it or not is a question I cannot
answer, but it was raised. I think the issue will simply boil down
to an international law and jurisdictional issue.
Certainly, the U.S. government cannot prevent people from
sending obscene or indecent material into the United States over
the Internet. The question is, once such material is imported into
the United States, is there some way to go after those people in a
foreign country? I think the answer is probably no, or only under
limited circumstances. Clearly the international aspect was consid-
ered, but I think the conclusion was, even if the U.S. government
cannot control obscene or indecent information coming from
abroad, the government can at least have an impact on information
that originates in the United States and is distributed to and from
points within the United States.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You said the bill overrules Stratton
Oakmont;208 could you explain that a little further?
MS. BUSH: In that case, the issue was the liability of a ser-
vice provider, Prodigy, where it affirmatively tried to control the
content of the materials it distributed online. Because of its exer-
cise of editorial control, Prodigy was found liable as a publisher.209
With the Good Samaritan law,2t0 Congress is saying that, if a com-
pany, like Citibank, for example, voluntarily takes steps to keep
people from distributing obscene, indecent, or otherwise objection-
able material over the Internet or through the company's system,
the company cannot then be held liable for any information that is
distributed.1  In other words, the idea is to encourage companies
to put in place mechanisms to prevent people from distributing
208. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 63 U.S.L.W. 2765, 23 Media L.
Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
209. Stratton Oakmont, 63 U.S.L.W. at 2766.
210. 1996 Act § 509, 110 Stat. at 138 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)); see
supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
211. 1996 Act § 509, 110 Stat. at 138 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)).
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obscene or indecent material without imposing liability on the com-
panies. This bill effectively reverses the Stratton Oakmont deci-
sion."'
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Referring to the Title V obscenity and
violence section again,213 I was wondering if anyone on the panel
can clarify whether it is limited to just the Internet or does it apply
to all telecommunication devices, such as laptop computers and
wireless telephones? Would it then require some sort of "indecen-
cy chip" installed in each device?
MR. HIRT: As a general matter, I have to decline to answer
questions about the Internet "indecency" issue since the "press
clips" that I have read suggest that suits will be filed challenging
the provision. It would not be consistent with my role in the DOJ
to answer questions on the subject any earlier than I might have to
if I am involved in such future litigation.
MS. BUSH: I am not absolutely sure of whether you were
asking about V-chips or about the Internet obscenity provision?
Section 223214 regulates the telephone industry, not the broadcast
industry, so I guess from that perspective, it could be read as hav-
ing a broader implication.
There has always been a prohibition on the distribution of ob-
scene material, either over television or telephone systems. ls The
issue has been that the telephone companies, as common carriers,
are prohibited from regulating the content or having any impact on
the content of information transmitted over their systems, which
has led to some fairly creative ways of trying to regulate the distri-
bution of obscene or indecent materials by telephone. 2 6 For exam-
212. Id.
213. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
214. 1996 Act § 502(1), 110 Stat. at 133 (to be codified as amending 47 U.S.C. §
223).
215. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (finding
constitutional a statutory ban on interstate transmission of obscene commercial telephone
messages, but finding the ban unconstitutional as applied to indecent commercial tele-
phone messages).
216. See id. at 119-23 (summarizing the FCC's responses to the mandate in the
Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-214, §
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ple, Congress, in the late 1980s or early 1990s, dealt with the
"900" number issue.217 It required the telephone companies to try
to take steps to encourage all the "900" telephone sex services to
require their customers to use a credit card, or to have some kind
of pre-subscription arrangement.21 ' There has always been a prohi-
bition in the obscenity area and efforts to deal with it through tele-
communications regulation, 2 9 but I have not studied it in depth.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I work for Teleport Communications
Group, which has been mentioned here by members of the panel.
I'd like to address the perception of local-exchange competition in
New York raised by both David Bronston and Michael Nugent. I
work for Teleport in the regulatory and External Affairs Depart-
ment, and part of my job is to go out and get our Certificate of
Service authorities which we have done in New York. Although
New York is considered a pro-competitive state and its commission
8(b), 97 Stat. 1470, that the FCC promulgate regulations specifying how dial-a-porn
sponsors could screen out underage callers).
217. See Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L.
No. 98-214, § 8(b), 97 Stat. 1470 (1988) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(1)(A) and
subsequently amended).
218. Under the mandate of the Federal Communications Commission Authorization
Act of 1983, the FCC attempted to promulgate regulations restricting minors' access to
obscene and indecent commercial telephone communications (dial-a-porn). Federal
Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-214, § 8, 97
Stat. 1467, 1469. The FCC first established as defenses time channeling and credit-card
screening, but the time channeling provision was set aside as both underinclusive and
overinclusive. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984)
("Carlin I"). The FCC next provided for defenses of credit card screening and access
codes, but rejected a proposal for customer premises blocking; due to the FCC's failure
to consider the blocking proposal adequately. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Carlin II"). Finally, the FCC proposed defenses for credit
card screening, access codes, and message scrambling, again rejecting the blocking pro-
posal; the court accepted these proposals but declared the statute unconstitutional as
applied to indecent speech. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988). Congress almost immediately amended 47
U.S.C. § 223(b) to prohibit all indecent and obscene commercial telephone communica-
tions to all people, regardless of age or willingness, however, it is this version of the
Communications Act of 1934 that the Supreme Court found constitutional for obscene,
but unconstitutional for indecent, commercial telephone communications, in Sable Com-
munications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
219. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1988).
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is pro-competitive, what we find in reality is that after we receive
our certificate, when we try to go out and negotiate interconnection
agreements and compensation issues, we find the negotiations get
dragged out"and in many cases the deals are not economic for us.
Meanwhile, the incumbent local-exchange company is often going
out and negotiating very favorable long-term agreements with some
of the best businesses to tie them up for years to come. So when
we get through all the steps necessary to become a local-exchange
company, we find that it is tough for us actually to do business.
The 1996 Act does not seem to have a lot of teeth in terms of what
is 'going to be required in terms of these interconnection arrange-
ments.
MR. BRONSTON: We are going to see the state PSCs drafting
these interconnection requirements and that is going to be part of
your cudgel, but again, the main benefit is that the RBOCs will not
be permitted to get into the promised land of long-distance until
there is viable local competition available to Teleport or MFS, and
Time Warner becomes a fully-integrated provider.
MR. NUGENT: Just to echo your point, I think it took too
long for New York Telephone to negotiate interconnection arrange-
ments220 that resulted in real benefits for users. I always wondered
why there was not more focus on that. The PSCs are going to
have to be really vigilant and the deals are going to have to be
very transparent. The contracts are going to have to be filed with
220. Interconnection agreements are:
agreements between alternative-access companies and Bell operating companies
on collocation. The agreements let the alternative-access companies put their
equipment in or near the operating companies' central offices. In effect, that
means the alternative-access companies can provide the same access to local
exchanges as the local operating companies. Such access ... could signal the
beginning of the end for the Bell companies' monopoly on local 'exchange
service.
Margie Semilof, Opening Up Local Access, COMM. WK., Mar. 4, 1991, at 26 ("So far,
one regional Bell holding company has struck a collocation agreement-NYNEX Corp.,
New York, which includes ... New York Telephone Co."); Anita Taff, NYNEX Agrees
to Collocate Alternative Carriers' Gear, NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 10, 1990, at 2
("NYNEX has been negotiating with Teleport for more than four years... on agreements
in New York alone. In May 1989, the New York Public Service Commission stepped in
and ordered NYNEX to work out interconnection agreements.").
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the FCC, as they are now, in a way that it can actually identify
what sweetheart deals have been cut. Users just have to negotiate
shorter deals. We have had a lot of pressure put on us to do long
deals, but those decade-long deals or seven-year deals just do not
make any sense in this day and age. I think the PSC is going to
have to be really vigilant.
MS. BUSH: I want to reemphasize what David Bronston said:
the legislation does give the BOCs incentive to encourage competi-
tion in their local market. Creation of such incentive was, I think,
a very smart move on the part of Congress, because despite what
Rich Devlin says, the BOCs really do want to get into the long-
distance business, even though he says they're not going to make
any money. Long-distance is a high priority for the BOCs, as it
should be. The BOCs, like the long-distance companies, know
how to provide telecommunications services. It certainly makes
more sense for the BOCs to extend their business in the direction
of long-distance telephone service rather than branching out into
cable or some other new areas, as some telephone companies have
tried to do recently.
There is another place where Teleport and others will have an
opportunity to have an impact on what the 1996 Act means. The
FCC must conduct rulemaking proceedings 22' to have to implement
the competitive checklist. Because some issues in the competitive
checklist will require further clarification by the FCC, there will be
an opportunity for Teleport and others to lobby the FCC on these
issues. The FCC will move on such issues fairly quickly since the
BOCs, for one, have incentive to see these issues resolved in a
timely fashion.
MR. NUGENT: I think we will see more interconnection be-
tween premises and the POPs 222 without having to interconnect to
the central offices. As I read the 1996 Act, it would be very diffi-
cult for the PSCs to limit such interconnection, even for termina-
221. 1996 Act § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 63 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1))
(requiring the FCC to complete all acts necessary to establish regulations implementing
the interconnection section).
222. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
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tion of public switched services.223 If AT&T were to buy MFS for
provision of local-exchange service and termination or origination
of long-distance service, I do not see a PSC being able to hobble
or discourage that without paying some kind of penalty.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Hirt, now that the divisions be-
tween cable and telephone and wireless are coming down through
horizontal and vertical mergers, how will the DOJ define markets?
Will the DOJ now have a different formula for determining the
"relevant market" and "market power" factors?
MR. HIRT: As John Tyler said this morning, I am a Civil
Division attorney, and I do not know how our Antitrust Division
will look at market issues. That is as much as I can say.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am interested in the implications for
average everyday Americans like myself. I was reading an article
in The New York Times on Friday that mentioned that, although
long-distance rates are expected to decrease, local rates will in-
crease.224 Is that true, and why? I do not understand why local
rates would actually increase instead of decrease.
MR. DEVLIN: I did not read the article, so I can't comment
definitively on that. But this is the phenomenon that I talked about
before-that is, residential rates are priced below cost for public
policy purposes. Since the 1934 Act was passed,225 there has been
a system of subsidies from long-distance to local service. Local
business users actually subsidize local residential service as well.
The public policy being advanced by the system of subsidies is to
keep rates low enough to attract as many residential customers to
the telephone system as possible.
When we change to a competitive environment, we introduce
competition into areas that are providing the local-service subsidy.
A great example is long-distance access charges. Long-distance
223. 1996 Act § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 68 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(2))
(specifying limited grounds for rejection by the state commission).
224. See generally Edmund L. Andrews, Clinton Set to Sign Bill That Is Expected
to Spur Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1996 ("consumer groups complained that the
measure would lead to higher prices for telephone and cable customers").
225. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1934).
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carriers like Sprint pay a lot of that subsidy. If we can buy from
somebody else, such as Teleport, that doesn't have to pay that
subsidy, then New York Telephone Company, from whom we
would otherwise buy, will have to lower its access rates to stay
competitive with companies like Teleport. It drives down the sub-
sidy and ultimately forces local rates up. In the long term, the
introduction of competition will cause prices to go down, but in the
short term, some prices will go up.
MR. BRONSTON: I agree with what Rich Devlin says: may-
be it is supposed to be a short-term anomaly. Any threat to univer-
sal service is a very serious threat that could divide us into infor-
mation haves and have-nots, so I would like to see some protection
for universal service. Maybe it can't be in the form of a subsi-
dy-we'll see about this universal service fund with the joint feder-
al/state board-but there has to be some protection for universal
service.
MS. BUSH: I am more optimistic that the FCC will preserve
universal service provisions. While I agree there is the possibility
of confusion initially, as we saw when we first experienced compe-
tition in the long-distance arena, I think it will settle out fairly
quickly. Much is dependent on what happens with universal ser-
vice. If universal service is revamped to include very expensive
services that are not widely used, then there will not be any choice
but to increase telephone rates. If full two-way video wires are
required into every home, it will cost money, and ultimately con-
sumers will have to pay for it.
In implementing universal service, the FCC and the joint board
have the opportunity to address this issue. Therefore, I am not
completely pessimistic that this will have the long-term negative
effects claimed by some. But I do think there will be some initial
confusion in the marketplace.
MR. NUGENT: Does anyone see local measured rates coming
in? In other words, instead of paying for local residential service
on a monthly flat fee, that we start paying per minute of use?
Does anyone see that as an alternative?
MS. BUSH: I do not know.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is to Mr. Hirt. You had
mentioned, in response to Mr. Joffe's argument regarding gatekeep-
ers and bottlenecking,226 that these roles will be maintained but will
change from a statutory framework to a regulatory framework.227
Considering that this is a change to a more private framework, I'd
like to know what you feel will be the First Amendment implica-
tions for the ordinary citizen.
MR. HIRT: If we go back to John Tyler's analogy,228 the prob-
lem of the telephone companies becoming cable operators in their,
own regions under this statute is the same issue that has been
raised in the "must-carry" context.229 The government's position
in defense of "must-carry" was that, if, by virtue of structure or
regulation or whatever past events, there was basically one choice
for entertainment, news, or other service,23 ° that provider in a sense
had been the cable operator, and was required to carry certain of-
ferings by competitors. Now the telephone companies are going to
say, we want to enter this field, and everybody will have the choice
of "two wires." I think one of the long-term debates is, will resi-
dential customers pick one wire for all of their services?
The government's position, reflecting the past statutes, has been
that where you have the carrier also providing the content, in which
it has an ownership interest and an operational interest, the carrier
is going to identify with that programming. Just as Time Warner
has an ownership interest in programmers, we understand, from the
litigation on the former cross-ownership rule, that the Bell Compa-
nies want to be programmers, too. They said, we do not simply
want to make money carrying other people's programs, we want
to produce our own programs. In the media there have been vari-
ous reports about the Bell Companies going to Hollywood and
226. See Panel I, supra note 146 (remarks of Robert Joffe).
227. See supra remarks of Theodore Hirt.
228. See Panel I, supra note 146 (remarks of John Tyler).
229. 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Carriage of Local Commercial Television Signals), § 535
(Carriage of Noncommercial Educational Television); see Turner Broadcasting Sys. v.
FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
230. 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Carriage of Local Commercial Television Signals), § 535
(Carriage of Noncommercial Educational Television).
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talking about independent creation of entertainment.
I am not saying there should not be entertainment brought to
you by the Bell Companies. That's not the point. The point is,
just as in the cable context, if the economics are going to be one
wire to the home, and you have the Bell Telephone Hour, you may
not only have the Bell Telephone Hour but you will also have the
Bell Telephone News Program, the Bell Telephone Movie Channel
... you can see where I'm going with that.
The bottom-line issue is still unsettled-will the First Amend-
ment be advanced or not advanced by this type of competitive
structure? Clearly, Congress felt that a competitive marketplace
was paramount, and yet, as I read to you from section 257,231 Con-
gress clearly wants to preserve or enhance the number of media
voices. The problem is, will any of these new competitive struc-
tures get us there?
To give you another example, when the FCC has to deal on an
administrative level with a programmer complaining that the
NYNEX cable system will not carry programmer's material, if I
understand the legislation right, the FCC will have to inquire
whether NYNEX was making a business decision not to carry this
programmer, or did NYNEX want to favor some programming that
it created "in-house" or through a subsidiary?
So the FCC will be the "gatekeeper" on a case-by-case basis for
these instances of alleged discrimination. I am not trying to be the
"prophet of doom and gloom"-maybe everything will work out
fine, and NYNEX will come in and compete with Time Warner,
and they'll all give everybody diverse programming choices, and
we, the consumers, the cable subscribers, will be in great shape.
But, we argued in the C & p 232 case, these were the concerns
that motivated Congress to keep the cross-ownership rule in effect.
Now Congress has decided to let this other mechanism work, so we
will have to see if it will work or not.
231. 1996 Act § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 77 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 257).
232. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1036
(1996).
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MS. BUSH: I think many would agree that if we could start
all over again with cable, cable would be a common carrier service.
Congress would have separated the ownership of the programming
from that of the wire. There would then be no debate on whether
you should have two wires into the home or one, because it would
not matter. Somebody would provide the wire and then lease ca-
pacity, as the telephone companies now do with some success. The
debate of vertical integration would be moot.
But Congress didn't do that. Those of us that thought that
cable should have been regulated as a common carrier service were
not around to suggest it at the time. If Congress knew then what
we know now, Congress could have addressed it that Way. The
vertical integration and the access to programming provisions in the
1992 Act 233 were basically an effort to remedy the problem associ-
ated with common control over both the programming and the
distribution wire.234 These provisions have now been extended to
vertically-integrated telephone companies 235 that want to provide
both programming and the wire into the home.
When we were working on the 1992 Act, the programming-
access provisions were the most controversial and were what pre-
vented a cable bill in 1990 or 1991. We were on the Senate floor
ready to introduce a bill, and Senator Wirth stood up and said, "Up
these program access provisions," and it brought the whole bill
down.236
Since enactment and FCC implementation of these provisions,
there has hardly been a complaint or objection from anybody.
They seem to be working, and they are no longer very controver-
sial. I assume that the same thing will happen when they are im-
plemented in the telephone arena.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am with Read & Laniado in Albany
and I have a partial answer to Mr. Nugent's question. NYNEX, at
233. 47 U.S.C. § 548(b).
234. 47 U.S.C. § 548(e).
235. 1996 Act § 302, 110 Stat. at 118-19 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(2)).
236. Senator Timothy Endicott Wirth (D. Colo.); see 138 CoNG. REC. S400, 421
(Jan. 27, 1992).
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least upstate, is packaging new local service deals, if you want to
call it that, where the customer has a choice between all-inclusive
local charges or per-minute charges. Whether you will see that in
the New York metro area, I do not know. Mr. Bronston could
probably explain some of the local concerns here that have basical-
ly restricted your local calling area to New York. But at least
upstate, the sort of world you want to see is coming.
In answer to the student's question about how much her bill
may change, I believe the current subsidy of the New York local
telephone bill is in the neighborhood of $12 a month. Whether that
is what your bill will change, no one knows, but for the state-wide
average, that is the subsidy.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I work at Teleport. My question is
directed to Mr. Devlin. Would you say the requirements to be
imposed on the RBOCs before they come into the long-distance
market are strong enough to create meaningful competition in the
market?
MR. DEVLIN: I do not think we know. It sure is a lot better
than the House Bill that passed this summer.237 The House Bill
only had a few competitive requirements. There was a requirement
that there be one competitor someplace in the state on a facilities
basis,238 and it could have been a niche competitor. There was also
a competitive checklist.239 But there was no DOJ review,24° nor an
FCC public interest review.24' So I think we are just going to see
how it plays out. On the face of it, Sprint is pleased. We think
that this piece of the legislation is fair.
237. H.R. 1555, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1995).
238. Id. § 245(a)(2)(A). The requirement of a facilities-based competitor is included
in the 1996 Act. 1996 Act § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 87 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
271(c)(1)(A)).
239. H.R. 1555, supra note 237, § 245(a)(1). The requirement of a competitive
checklist is included in the 1996 Act. 1996 Act § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 88 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)).
240. The requirement of a DOJ review is included in the 1996 Act. 1996 Act §
151(a), 110 Stat. at 89 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(A)).
241. The requirement of an FCC public interest review is included in the 1996 Act.
Id. at § 151, 110 Stat. at 89 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C)).
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Going back to what Mr. Hirt men-
tioned concerning the C & P case 242-which is right now pending
before the Supreme Court-is that ruling, if it comes out, going to
be moot due to the new legislation? 243 My second question is this:
as you know, both Bell Atlantic and NYNEX bought CAI Wire-
less; 2" how much of CAI Wireless will have to reach the markets
before Bell Atlantic and NYNEX will be considered to have pene-
trated the cable marketplace for video programming?
MR. BRONSTON: I think the answer to the last part is 15
percent within a franchise area. New York City has essentially ten
franchise areas.245 This is a question I am currently looking into.
I think the only real effect, though, is that it ends rate regulation
for that area.
MR. HIRT: On the first point, which is whether telephone
company challenges to the cross-ownership statute,246 such as the
C & P case, are moot: that is a decision the Solicitor General's
office is making or maybe has made. Certainly there could be a
good argument made that there is not much point in litigating a
statute that, as of tomorrow, is "off the books" and replaced by a
whole new scheme. Therefore, I am sure we will find out the
answer to that fairly soon.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I do not fully understand what the
role of the DOJ will be when a BOC claims to have fulfilled the
requirements of the 1996 Act and goes to the FCC, and the FCC
242. See supra text accompanying note 232.
243. Subsequent to this symposium, on Feb. 27, 1996, the Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
for consideration of the question of mootness. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va.
v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4115 (1996).
244. Actually, Bell Atlantic and NYNEX invested in CAI, but did not buy it. See,
e.g., Julie Carr Smyth, Telecommunications Turf War Likely to Grow Hotter, TIMES
UNION (One Star Ed.), Feb. 25, 1996, at T45; David Orenstein, CAI Wireless President
to Lead New Subsidiary, TIMES UNION, Feb. 8, 1996, at C7; Michael Farrell, CAI's New
Firm Stirs Talk of Sale, CAP. DISTRICT Bus. REV., Dec. 18, 1995, Sec. 1, at 1.
245. The franchise areas are Northern Manhattan, Southern Manhattan, the Bronx,
Western Brooklyn, Eastern Brooklyn, Southeast Queens, Western Queens, Northeast
Queens, Northern Staten Island, and Southern Staten Island.
246. 47 U.S.C. 533(b), repealed by 1996 Act § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 124.
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defers to the DOJ.247 What type of parameters or standards is the
DOJ going to use? How will the DOJ respond to that type of re-
quest by the FCC?
MR. HIRT: Again, I am not from the Antitrust Division. All
I can say is to second what Rich Devlin said about the terms of the
1996 Act. The statute, if I read it correctly in the Conference Re-
port, says the FCC shall give substantial weight to the Attorney
General's view and that the Attorney General has flexibility in
whatever standards are to be applied to this situation.248 But I
cannot tell you how our Antitrust Division will look at it. As Rich
Devlin has pointed out, there is certainly a role for the Attorney
General in looking at what the FCC proposes.
MR. DEVLIN: If I may provide a little historical perspective
for that particular phrase in the legislation. In prior iterations of
this bill, starting in 1992, the legislation purported to describe a
standard that the DOJ would have to impose. For example, one
standard was "no substantial possibility that the Bell Operating
Company could impede competition in the market it seeks to en-
ter."249 Through the legislative process, different formulations were
proposed, some which made absolutely no sense at all from an
antitrust standpoint. So Anne Bingaman and President Clinton and
Vice-President Gore argued strongly that the DOJ review must be
independent and Congress should not prescribe specifically how it
should be done.
DR. PHELAN: If there are no other questions on this point, let
me just throw something out to the panel that is a little more gen-
eral. What concerns me when I see this new law is, what is the
presupposition or the unstated assumption behind the formulation
and direction of the law? Whatever litigation may occur in the
future, what are the unstated assumptions about the public? Is the
public conceived of as a group of individual consumers who are
247. 1996 Act § 151(a), 110 Stat. at 89 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(A)).
248. Id.
249. See 1995 WL 599805 (F.D.C.H., Oct. 12, 1995) (testimony of Anne K.
Binghaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, DOJ, before the Subcommit-
tee on Oversight & Investigations, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representa-
tive).
[Vol. 6:517
1996] SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON THE 1996 TELECOM ACT 575
basically passive people, who are going to just negotiate a price for
an already-determined product, that itself will be determined by
market research of some kind? Is this bill divorced completely
from notions that have been enshrined in earlier law with regard to
public interest and diversity, for instance?
I raise this question because the Market Model seems to be so
congenial to the Transportation Model I referred to when we began.
The Market Model is concerned with rates, sales, and things of that
type. The diversity referred to here is the diversity of source. In
other words, if I say exactly what Mike Nugent says, but I am a
different guy from Mike Nugent, then according to this way of
looking at things, that is "diverse"-even though we may be saying
the same thing.
Look at what happened in the development of broadcasting, for
instance. In the news business, there are competitors. There are
very strong competitors. But it does not create the diversity that
we normally would think of in terms of the marketplace of ideas.
What happens is you have a convergence of the same kinds of
news, so you have the perennial TimelNewsweek covers that reflect
one another. You have the three networks going after the same.
type of audience. The only diversity you have is in the so-called
"niche" market.
There is a recently-published book by a professor named Lance
Bennett, called The Governing Crisis.250 He says in this book that
the tremendous use of marketing methods in elections has frag-
mented the electorate.251 Whereas before, for good or for ill, candi-
dates would try to present some sort of unifying vision to gather
together a following and thus be elected,252 now, with the new
marketing methods, there is an attempt deliberately to divide the
electorate and to accentuate the differences that already exist, in
250. W. LANCE BENNETT, THE GOVERNING CRISIS: MEDIA, MONEY, AND MARKET-
ING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (1992).
251. Id. at 16-19, 32-33 (arguing that changes in campaign financing systems, sys-
temic marketing of campaign dates, and perfection of techniques for controlling the news
media have contributed to a decline in governing standards).
252. Id.
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order to gain a crucial marketing niche for a winning vote.
He does a very impressive and convincing analysis, which indi-
cates that something like three percent of the people eligible to
vote are very crucial in the determination of a national election.254
The people who do market research know who those three percent
are and spend a lot of time trying to get that three percent.
The reason I mention it is, it would seem that the notion of
competition, the notion of a lot more players, in terms of the trans-
portation model, makes sense. But if you also look at communica-
tions as a vehicle for democratic discourse, I do not think it makes
sense, just as I do not think marketing makes sense in health care.
So I tend to see the diversity question in the marketing model in
the same way you would look upon managed competition and
HMOs. I think it has had a bad effect on medicine, and I think the
same methods will have a bad effect on public debate as carried on
in our channels of communication. I realize there are a lot of little
spurs and hooks on what I just said. David Bronston, do you have
a reaction?
MR. BRONSTON: I think there is a threat to diversity in con-
solidation. An example that is often brought up is when the long-
distance coalition wanted to run ads on CNN against this legisla-
tion, and the powers that be at CNN and Time Warner, which has
a controlling stake in CNN and Turner Broadcasting, decided, "No,
we want this legislation and therefore we are not going to run these
ads." So I think we have to be very vigilant about the threats to
diversity posed by the potential consolidations and vertical integra-
tions.
DR. PHELAN: Ms. Bush, you said earlier, if I remember cor-
rectly, that one of the reasons this legislation went through a little
faster than some people thought it would, was that there was not
a tremendous amount of consumer interest compared to the interest
shown about some other pieces of legislation. I wonder if there is
some kind of connection between the so-called lack of consumer
253. Id.
254. Id.
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interest and the lack of major-media coverage of the details of the
bill. It really was not covered, just as campaign finance reform is
certainly not covered that much in the media, because it seems to
be against the interest of the people who are supposed to report on
it. Do you have any comment on that?
MS. BUSH: I do not think it is that simple. People would like
to say the media didn't really cover the 1996 Act, or didn't cover
it in enough detail or present it in a way that people were likely to
understand. Based on my experience, there was more media cover-
age of the 1992 Act, although the coverage came toward the end
of the legislative process. There was an intense media blitz by the
broadcasters supporting the 1996 Act and the cable industry oppos-
ing the Act. It was interesting, because obviously both groups
controlled access to people's homes.
I was working for Senator Hollings255 when the 1992 Act was
in its infancy, and what got the 1992 Act moving-because there
really was not an interest on the part of many elected officials to
do a new cable bill since they had just completed the 1984 Act,
and the bill that became the 1992 Act started in 1987 or
1988-was that he did a 46 county tour of South Carolina. In one
year he visited every county in his state. He was prepared to talk
about issues such as the budget and foreign affairs, but every place
he went, people wanted to talk about cable. The city officials, the
county officials, and constituents were concerned about their cable
rates. That grass-roots concern is what got the cable legislation
moving. The 1996 Act did not present that same dynamic. People
are fairly happy with their telephone service. You do not hear
local officials saying that their constituents are calling with com-
plaints about their telephone bills. So, while there may have been
an absence of media coverage, in part the lack of consumer interest
in the 1996 Act was because people are not really concerned about
the telephone industry: they think their telephone service is fine.
The emergence of competition into the local telephone marketplace
255. Senator Ernest F. "Fritz" Hollings (D. S.C.), then-Chairman of the Senate
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee and now the Ranking Minority Mem-
ber on that committee.
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is an abstract concept. In contrast, when the 1992 Act was pend-
ing, many consumers had just experienced significant cable rate
increases. Some consumers saw their cable bills double from one
week to the next, and so consumers had a really strong feeling
about the cable industry.
The cable industry, unfortunately, is still subject'to those strong
feelings. Most people do not have many positive things to say
about their cable operator, but that is not the case with the tele-
phone industry. Indeed, I do believe that the public opinion about
the cable industry is why significant changes in the cable provi-
sions were not part of the 1996 Act. Cable rate regulation does
end in three years. Originally Congress had proposed elimination
of rate regulation sooner, but I think the Congress got nervous.
Members were concerned that, if they did phase out rate regulation,
and rates went up again, constituents would express their anger
through their vote.
DR. PHELAN: I think we are going to let Toni Bush have the
last word on this. I want to thank the panel. I really learned a lot
from this afternoon and the questions were extremely provocative.
Thank you for joining us today.
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